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Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism
ALEC STONE SWEET* AND JUD MATHEWS**
Over the past fifty years, proportionality balancing-
an analytical procedure akin to "strict scrutiny" in
the United States-has become a dominant technique
of rights adjudication in the world. From German
origins, proportionality analysis spread across
Europe, into Commonwealth systems (Canada, New
Zealand, South Africa), and Israel; it has also
migrated to treaty-based regimes, including the
European Union, the European Convention on Human
Rights, and the World Trade Organization. Part 11
proposes a theory of why judges are attracted to the
procedure, an account that blends strategic and
normative elements. Parts III and IV provide a
genealogy of proportionality, trace its global
diffusion, and evaluate its impact on law and politics
in a variety of settings, both national and
supranational. In the conclusion, we discuss our
major finding, namely, that proportionality constitutes
a doctrinal underpinning for the expansion ofjudicial
power globally. Although there is significant
variation in how it is used, judges who adopt
proportionality position themselves to exercise
dominance over policymaking and constitutional
development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, proportionality analysis (PA) has
widely diffused. It is today an overarching principle of constitutional
adjudication, the preferred procedure for managing disputes
involving an alleged conflict between two rights claims, or between a
rights provision and a legitimate state or public interest. With the
consolidation of the "new constitutionalism," 1 this type of dispute
1. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. See also ALEC STONE SWEET,
GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000); RAN HIRSCHL,
TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
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has come to dominate the dockets of constitutional and supreme
courts around the world. Although other modes of rights
adjudication were available and could have been chosen and
developed, PA has emerged as a multi-purpose, best-practice,
standard.
From German origins, PA has spread across Europe,
including to the post-Communist states in Central and Eastern
Europe, and into Israel. It has been absorbed into Commonwealth
systems-Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and via European
law, the U.K.-and it is presently making inroads into Central and
South America. By the end of the 1990s, virtually every effective
system of constitutional justice in the world, with the partial
exception of the United States, had embraced the main tenets of PA.
Strikingly, proportionality has also migrated to the three treaty-based
regimes that have serious claims to be considered "constitutional" in
some meaningful sense: the European Union (EU),2 the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),3 and the World Trade
Organization (WTO). 4  In our view, proportionality-based rights
adjudication now constitutes one of the defining features of global
constitutionalism, if global constitutionalism can be said to exist at
all.
In this paper, we seek to explain why this has happened,
through what processes, and with what consequences for judicial
authority. Because some readers might not be familiar with PA, it
might be useful to summarize the basics. PA is a doctrinal
construction: it emerged and then diffused as an unwritten, general
principle of law through judicial recognition and choice. For our
2. Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 118-
19 (2004); JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES
HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999).
3. Evert Albert Alkema, The European Convention as a Constitution and its Court as
a Constitutional Court, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 41
(Paul Mahoney et al. eds., 2000); Jean-Franqoise Flauss, La Cour Europ~enne des droits de
l'homme est-elle une cour constitutionnelle?, 36 REVUE FRANI;AISE DE DROIT
CONSTITUTIONNEL 711 (1999). See also STEPHEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) (discussing the "constitutionalization" of the European Court of
Human Rights and the "constitutional justice" dispensed by the ECHR).
4. DEBORAH CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (2005); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights,
3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 19 (2000); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EURO. J.
INT'L L. 623 (2006).
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purposes, it is a decision-making procedure 5 and an "analytical
structure"6 that judges employ to deal with tensions between two
pleaded constitutional "values" or "interests."
In the paradigmatic situation, PA is triggered once a prima
facie case has been made to the effect that a right has been infringed
by a government measure. 7 In its fully developed form, the analysis
involves four steps, 8 each involving a test. First, in the "legitimacy"
stage, the judge confirms that the government is constitutionally-
authorized to take such a measure. Put differently, if the purpose of
the government's measure is not a constitutionally legitimate one,
then it violates a higher norm (the right being pleaded). The second
phase-"suitability"-is devoted to judicial verification that, with
respect to the act in question, the means adopted by the government
are rationally related to stated policy objectives. The third step-
"necessity"-has more bite. The core of necessity analysis is the
deployment of a "least-restrictive means" (LRM) test: the judge
ensures that the measure does not curtail the right any more than is
necessary for the government to achieve its stated goals. PA is a
balancing framework: if the government's measure fails on
suitability or necessity, the act is per se disproportionate; it is
outweighed by the pleaded right and therefore unconstitutional. The
last stage, "balancing in the strict sense," is also known as
"proportionality in the narrow sense." If the measure under review
passes the first three tests, the judge proceeds to balancing stricto
senso. In the balancing phase, the judge weighs the benefits of the
5. As a general principle of law, some form of proportionality is found in most stable
legal systems. In criminal law, the severity of punishment is expected to be proportionate to
the seriousness of the crime, in classic international law, proportionality is found in the law
of reprisal and the use of force, and so on. Our focus is on PA as an argumentation and
balancing framework.
6. Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain
of Constitutional Justice, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 574, 579 (2004).
7. In a leading child pornography case, R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (Can.), the
Canadian Supreme Court held that a provision of the Criminal Code, as applied to Mr.
Sharpe, violated his freedom of expression but was justified as a proportional measure
designed to protect children from "exploitation." The approach thus contrasts with
categorical, rule-based approaches to rights protection that seek to dispense with balancing
once the nature and scope of the right has been defined. In this latter approach, a court
might decide that Mr. Sharpe's rights were not abridged, since child pornography is not a
protected form of expression, per se. Cf United States v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
8. Some courts-including those of the EU, the ECHR, and the WTO-normally use
only a three-part test, leaving out the "legitimate purpose" stage. The analysis is thus
entirely focused on the relationship between means and ends.
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act-which has already been determined to have been "narrowly
tailored," in American parlance-against the costs incurred by
infringement of the right, in order to determine which "constitutional
value" shall prevail, in light of the respective importance of the
values in tension, given the facts.
9
In many polities today, proportionality is treated as a taken-
for-granted feature of constitutionalism, or a criterion for the
perfection of the "rule of law." For us, this "taken-for-granted"
quality is an outcome of a social process that, like any social process,
can and should be examined empirically. Treating PA as a natural,
inherent principle of the legal system disguises the open-ended
process through which it emerged, and downplays the controversies
that PA routinely occasions among judges, elected officials, and
scholars. The source of the anxiety is clear: however inherently
"judicial" one takes the procedure to be, the LRM and balancing
stages of PA fully expose judges as lawmakers. Indeed, the
framework is typically debated from two opposed standpoints.10
Some see it as dangerous: judges may defer too much to legislators
and executives; they may even "balance rights away." Others see PA
as being too restrictive of policy discretion, inevitably casting judges
as masters of the policy processes under review. 1 Proponents
defend proportionality against attacks from both sides. 12 Although
we will join this debate, it is important to emphasize that PA is an
analytical procedure-it does not, in itself, produce substantive
outcomes. That point made, judges also use proportionality as a
9. In the United States, the government will prevail once a court determines that a
government measure under review furthers a "compelling interest" and has been "narrowly-
tailored." An exercise akin to balancing may take place at the compelling interest stage, but
in some cases, it remains an open question whether a law that passes a LRM test nonetheless
infringes more on the right at play than is tolerable; an obvious example is United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), where the right being pleaded by Mr. O'Brien received no
analytical attention at all.
10. The standard European reference is the debate between JORGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs 256-59 (William Rehg trans., The MIT Press 1996) and
Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131, 131-
40 (2003). Daniel Halberstam surveys differing American and Continental approaches to
balancing, and examines American ambivalence toward PA, in Desperately Seeking Europe:
On Comparative Methodology and the Conception of Rights, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L 166 (2007).
11. In the American context, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). U.S. and European perspectives on
constitutional rights and balancing are debated in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM
(Georg Nolte ed., Council of Europe Publishing 2005).
12. See, e.g., DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159-76 (2004).
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foundation on which to build doctrine, the "argumentation
frameworks" that govern rights litigation.
The paper is organized as follows. Part I proposes a theory
of proportionality that blends strategic and formal legal elements. It
is argued that adopting an explicit balancing posture gives distinct
advantages to the rights adjudicator, and that PA provides a
principled doctrinal foundation for balancing. We give empirical
content to these ideas in two ways. First, we emphasize the neat "fit"
between proportionality and the structure of contemporary rights
provisions. Second, we provide a brief summary and analysis of
Robert Alexy's influential theory of constitutional rights. 13 Parts III
and IV of the paper provide a genealogy of PA, trace its global
diffusion, and assess its impact on law and politics in a variety of
settings, both national and supranational. In Part V, we assess the
relationship between PA and judicial power. Although PA can be
portrayed as a "neutral" procedure, its adoption has-inexorably-
led to a steady accretion of judicial authority over how constitutions
evolve and how policy is made.
We do not want to be misunderstood on this last point. PA
helps judges manage disputes that take a particular form; it does not
dictate correct answers to legal problems. As argued in Part II, the
key to the political success of PA-its social logic-is that it
provides a set of relatively stable, off-the-shelf, solutions to a set of
generic dilemmas faced by the constitutional judge. If PA mitigates
certain legitimacy problems, it also creates, or at least spotlights, an
intractable, second-order, problem. PA does not camouflage judicial
lawmaking. Properly employed, it requires courts to acknowledge
and defend-honestly and openly-the policy choices that they make
when they make constitutional choices. Proportionality is not a
magic wand that judges wave to make all of the political dilemmas of
rights review disappear. Indeed, waving it will expose rights
adjudication for what it is: constitutionally-based lawmaking.
Nonetheless, one of our claims (elaborated on in Part II) is that PA
offers the best position currently available for judges seeking to
rationalize and defend rights review, given certain strategic
considerations, the structure of modern rights provisions, and the
precepts of contemporary constitutionalism. To be clear: we do not
13. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1986).
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argue that PA necessarily makes any politico-legal system more just,
or otherwise better off, relative to alternatives. Indeed, we do not
explicitly theorize a normative position, although one is implied.
Rather, our goal is to explain why judges would be attracted to PA,
and then to trace the process through which PA has, in fact, been
adopted.
In the conclusion, we discuss, in more general and
comparative terms, the relationship between proportionality and
judicial power. When a court moves to adopt PA as an operating
system to manage rights adjudication, it alters the relationship
between judicial authority and all other public authority, enhancing
the former. Consider alternatives. Courts could, as in
Commonwealth systems of yore, choose to operate under the
"Wednesbury reasonableness"'14 standard developed by British
courts, wherein judicial review of government measures is only
granted if the claimant can demonstrate that officials have acted
irrationally. The judge must find that officials have made a decision
that no rational decision-maker could have made. Wednesbury
reasonableness is a deference doctrine, a cousin of "rational basis"
inquiry in the United States. In most Continental systems, like
France and Italy, courts used, pre-proportionality, various standards,
including "manifest error of appreciation" (granting very wide
deference), to "reasonableness" (a kind of inchoate intermediate
standard in American parlance), and various modes of ultra vires (or
abuse of discretion) review. 15 Adopting proportionality replaces all
of these standards with something akin to strict scrutiny, positioning
courts to exercise dominance over both policy and constitutional
development. However, to reiterate: the choice to deploy PA, in and
of itself, does not determine how PA will, in fact, be deployed.
This paper is the first of two on this topic; the second will
examine the evolution of American rights doctrine through the lenses
of proportionality and global constitutionalism. Reversing the
relationship, considering PA through American lenses, reveals a
puzzle that is at the heart of our concerns. The "necessity" phase of
PA-with its "least-restrictive means" test-is also a constituent
14. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 K.B. 223
(U.K.).




element of American "strict scrutiny."' 6  In the United States, it
seems fair to state, judicial review of government acts has been the
most controversial activity engaged in by the Supreme Court. It also
seems fair to state that rights review, under a strict scrutiny standard,
is the most contested form of judicial review, in part, because it leads
to judicial supremacy over outcomes. From this American
perspective, it appears quite remarkable that so many new courts,
operating in environments traditionally hostile to judicial review,
have so quickly and successfully embraced what is, inarguably, the
most intrusive form of review found anywhere. It bears emphasis
that judges chose to adopt and develop the proportionality
framework; it was not imposed on them. In the next section, we
develop an explanation of why they have done so.
II. THEORY
The phenomenon we seek to explain-the emergence of PA
as a global constitutional standard' - is enormously complex,
16. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING: CASES
AND MATERIALS 966 (5th ed. 2006) ("Today the Court describes the strict scrutiny test as
whether the law in question is 'narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
interest."').
17. Despite proportionality's striking diffusion globally, there is only a small body of
work that seeks to explain or compare how PA has emerged and with what consequences. A
recent edited volume on "the migration of constitutional ideas" has no chapter devoted to the
spread of proportionality. THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). There are a few comparative treatments of proportionality,
but these tend to be focused more narrowly on the doctrinal particulars of the various
jurisdictions. See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE
(Evelyn Ellis ed., Hart Publishing 1999). Indeed, a number of works restrict their scope to
European jurisdictions and/or proportionality as a principle of administrative law. See, e.g.,
GEORGE GERAPETRITIS, PROPORTIONALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
FRANCE, GREECE, ENGLAND AND IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1997); ROBERT THOMAS,
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2000).
Although it is not his main focus, Nicholas Emiliou argues that the turn to PA follows from
the growth of the modem interventionist state: proportionality is "a most appropriate tool to
control interventionist activity for the creation of a welfare state." NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 21 (1996).
David Beatty takes a broader view of proportionality in his book, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF
LAW. Beatty presents proportionality as a principle of constitutional justice that deserves
universal acceptance, and he briefly charts its adoption in a number of jurisdictions. Beatty
is less concerned with the mechanics of proportionality's diffusion, or PA's political effects;
its diffusion provides evidence of its universalist potential as a "neutral principle." DAVID
M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159 (2004). Vicki Jackson wrote a penetrating
review of Beatty's book in which she offered some of her own thoughts about the pros and
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involving hundreds of discrete decisions taken by actors, public and
private, operating in very different political contexts and legal
settings. The first part of the explanation therefore rests on a set of
simplifying assumptions, and a series of generic arguments related to
classic dilemmas of adjudication. How can judges bolster the
perception, among losing parties (or legal interests), that their
decisions are not the product of bias in favor of winning parties (or
legal interests)? If the law evolves primarily through judicial
interpretation and application, how can judges depict this
"lawmaking" as "judicial," rather than "legislative"? If rights
provisions are relatively open-ended norms, how can a rights-
protecting court escape the charge that it is both master of the
constitution and of the decision-making of the "political" branches of
government? In adopting the proportionality framework,
constitutional judges acquire a coherent, practical means of
responding to these basic legitimacy questions. As important, once
adopted, PA tends to develop a normative status of its own,
comprising a new element of a "presupposed Grundnorm,"' or a
meta-constitutional principle governing the development of
constitutional doctrine. We interpret Alexy's account of rights-as
"optimization requirements"-in light of this tendency. The question
of how PA in fact diffused, with what consequences for judicial
power, demands a separate treatment, which is provided in Parts III-
V.
A. Two-Against-One
We proceed from a simple, reductive theory of third-party
cons of proportionality analysis. See Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About
Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803 (2004) (reviewing DAVID M. BEATTY, THE
ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004)). Jackson's review is among the more perceptive writings
on proportionality analysis in English, but it does not engage with the question of
proportionality's diffusion. Finally, Mattias Kumm brings considerations of normative
jurisprudence to bear on the practice of PA in a recent paper that deserves wide
consideration. Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the
Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS, DISCOURSE: THEMES
OF THE WORK OF ROBERT ALEXY 131 (Stanley Paulson & George Pavlakos eds., Hart 2007).
18. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 208-09 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson &
Stanley L. Paulson trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1934) (arguing that successful changes




dispute resolution (TDR). 19 At its core is an insight first made by
anthropologists, namely, that the social demand for TDR is so
intensive and universal that one finds no society that fails to supply it
in some form. When two parties in dispute ask a third party for
assistance, they build, through a consensual act of delegation, a node
of social authority, or mode of governance. 20  By "mode of
governance," we mean a process through which the rule systems
(norms, law) in place in any society are applied and adapted, on an
ongoing basis, to the needs and purposes of those who live under
them. The theory focuses on the dynamics and political
consequences of moving from the dyad (cooperation, conflict,
dispute settlement between two parties) to the triadic context, and
moving from consensual TDR to compulsory TDR.
Triadic governance contains a fundamental tension that
threatens to destroy it. In consensual TDR, the triadic figure knows
that her social legitimacy rests in part on the consent of the parties,
and thus on the perception that she is neutral vis 6 vis the dispute.
Yet in declaring a winner, she creates a 2-against-I situation that is
likely to erode that perception. Given a fundamental interest in not
declaring a loser, she will seek to mediate settlements, or to "split the
difference" between the parties. If one party must win, the typical
solution is to base the outcome on pre-existing norms. By definition,
a society's norms, whether informal or formalized as law, comprise
ready-made standards of appropriate behavior, and thus facilitate
dispute settlement. In invoking norms, the triadic figure is, in effect,
saying to the loser, "you have not lost because I prefer your opponent
to you; you have lost because it is my responsibility to uphold what is
right in our community, given the harm that has occurred." Her
legitimacy now rests, in part, on the perceived legitimacy of a third
interest being brought to bear on the parties-the social interest
embodied in the norms being applied. In any community, of course,
the "perceived legitimacy" of applicable norms, and therefore of
TDR, will vary across time and contexts.
Old-fashioned legal anthropology 2 1 and "new" economic
19. See Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32
COMP. POL. STUD. 147 (1999). See also MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1986); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS,
AND JUDICIALIZATION (2002) (especially Chapter 4: Testing and Comparison).
20. SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 19; see also STONE SWEET, supra note 2, at 6.
21. See JANE FISHBURNE COLLIER, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ZINACANTAN (1973).
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approaches to norms 22 have shown that consensual TDR in close-knit
societies typically operates to reassert pre-existing norms, or to
evolve new ones only gradually. In social settings characterized by
rising levels of interdependence (increased social differentiation,
division of labor, impersonal contracting across larger distances) and
rising transaction costs, the functional demand for TDR overlaps with
a growing need for rule adaptation (lawmaking). In such situations,
consensual TDR, with its emphasis on settling conflict through
(re)enactment of existing norms, is often insufficient to sustain
increasing levels of social exchange. Governance and commitment
devices-law and adjudication-are all but required.
B. Courts and Judicial Lawmaking
The move to adjudication aggravates the 2-against-i
dilemma, in at least two ways. First, the judge's authority is fixed by
office and compulsory jurisdiction, backed by the state's enforcement
capacities. Courts are still ritually portrayed in terms of an "orthodox
prototype," which highlights their TDR functions and properties.
And judges still seek to avoid or mitigate the effects of declaring a
loser, through the development of settlement regimes, splitting the
costs of a decision among the parties, processing appeals, and so on.
But, from the point of view of defendants and losers, at least, judges
are part and parcel of the coercive apparatus of the state. Second,
given a steady caseload, adjudicators will make law. One can
assume, as we do for the purposes of this paper, that this lawmaking
behavior is primarily defensive. The judge develops rhetorics of
justification, in part, to counter the perception of bias. Even so, a
record of deliberation-the giving of reasons-will have prospective,
regulatory effects, so long as some minimal notion of precedent
exists in the system.
From the perspective of 2-against-I, judicial lawmaking
raises a second-order legitimacy dilemma, given that the "content of
the law governing the dispute could not have been ascertained by the
parties at the time [it] erupted., 23 The applicable law is revealed
22. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
23. Stone Sweet, supra note 19, at 157.
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through the judge's ruling. How one should properly understand
judicial lawmaking, and how the legitimacy of courts ought to be
evaluated in the face of ongoing lawmaking, are questions that have
24haunted democratic and legal theory over centuries. Here we note
only two responses to them.
One major stream of positivist theory emphasizes how the
law itself constrains judges. Hart implies that the extent of defensible
lawmaking discretion in place at any point is proportional to the
extent of indeterminacy of the pertinent law.25 Judicial lawmaking
can be defended insofar as it proceeds in light of existing law and
precedent, and to the extent that it "renders" that law more
determinate. The argument is functional: if judges did not possess
lawmaking discretion, they would not be able to perform their
adjudication role properly, given indeterminacy and other
uncertainties. For MacCormick, a close student of Hart's, the
primary objective of legal theory is the development of standards for
evaluating a court's jurisprudence as "good or bad," and "rational or
arbitrary." Good decisions are arrived at through deliberation and
analogical reasoning; and the good judge packages his lawmaking as
a relatively redundant, self-evident, incremental extension of
available legal materials.26 A set of (not incompatible) arguments
proceeds from standard delegation theory. In modem constitutional
systems, judicial power is delegated power. Rulers (the principals)
confer lawmaking discretion on courts (their agents) for sound
functional reasons, and good agents are those that use this authority
to perform the tasks given to them. When the system operates
properly, courts help rulers govern more efficiently. When the
principals are not unified but multiple actors (political parties, states,
and so on) are competing for power amongst themselves, they may
turn to courts as commitment devices. Consider a federalism court, a
rights court, the European Court of Justice, or the WTO Appellate
Body. In these cases, the agent-what we will call a trustee court in
the next section--enforces constitutional bargains struck by the
principals (political parties, Member States) even against the
24. The crisis engendered by judicial lawmaking also generates mountains of legal
materials-judicial decisions, commentaries and treatises-whose purpose is to reassert the
coherence and underlying stability of the law, and therefore the legitimacy of courts, with
reference to precedent and settled canons of interpretation and reasoning.
25. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-47 (2d ed. 1994).
26. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978).
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principals. Further, as with any complex contract, constitutions are
fundamentally incomplete. The contracting parties need judges not
only to resolve disputes among them, but to clarify their obligations,
over time, as disputes arise and circumstances change. It follows that
judicial lawmaking counts as a positive to the extent that it operates
to help principals deal with their governance problems, including
imperfect commitment and legal indeterminacy.
In this view, judicial lawmaking is a normal by-product of
delegating to constitutional judges, which is, at worst, a reasonable,
predictable price to pay for obtaining some greater social benefit:
protecting rights, securing federalism, making trading blocs work.
For their part, judges build constitutional doctrine-those constraints
on the exercise of lawmaking discretion presumed to be stable.
Yet debates about the legitimacy of "judicial activism" rage
on, and for an obvious reason. As we move from (1) consensual
TDR, to (2) a judge interpreting a statute in order to apply it, to (3) a
constitutional court enforcing rights against a legislative majority, the
triadic figure is increasingly implicated in systemic governance, and,
in situation (3), the court governs the political rulers. In rights
adjudication, wherein litigating parties always represent some wider
social interest, lawmaking and 2-against-i necessarily overlap. A
court that chooses one constitutional value over another is also
favoring one policy interest over another. Other things being equal,
the most acute form of this problem will appear under conditions of
judicial supremacy.
C. Judicial Supremacy: the "New Constitutionalism" and the
Trustee Court
Over the past fifty years, the "new constitutionalism" has
swept across the globe, and today has no rival as a template for the
organization of the state.27 The model's precepts can be simply
27. By the 1990s, the basic formula of the new constitutionalism-(a) a written,
entrenched constitution, (b) a charter of rights, and (c) a review mechanism to protect
rights-had become standard, even for what most of us would consider non-democratic,
authoritarian states. There are 194 states in a recent data set on constitutional forms
compiled by Alec Stone Sweet and Cristina Andersen. Of these, 190 have written
constitutions, of which 183 contain a charter of rights. There have been 114 constitutions
written since 1985 (not all of which have lasted), and we have reliable information on 106 of
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listed: (a) institutions of government are established by, and derive
their authority exclusively from, a written constitution; (b) the
constitution assigns ultimate power to the people by way of elections
or referenda; (c) the use of public authority, including legislative
authority, is lawful only insofar as it conforms with the constitutional
law; (d) the constitution provides for a catalogue of rights, and a
system of constitutional justice to defend those rights; 28 and (e) the
constitution itself specifies how it may be revised. The "new
constitutionalism" is based on the precept that rights and effective
rights protection are basic to the democratic legitimacy of the state.
It therefore rejects models of legislative sovereignty (e.g., of
Australia, the French Third and Fourth Republics, and of Great
Britain until recently), as well as those ideologies that would confer
on one person or party unconstrained political authority.
29
To be viable, the form requires massive delegation to
constitutional judges. Under the classic (today virtually defunct)
"legislative sovereignty" constitution, one can portray courts as
agents (or slaves) of the legislature. The basic principal-agent
framework, however, loses its relevance when it comes to modern
systems of constitutional justice. A more appropriate metaphor is
that of constitutional "trusteeship": situations wherein the founders
of new constitutions delegate expansive, open-ended "fiduciary"
powers to a review court. 30  A trustee is a particular kind of agent,
possessing the power to govern the rulers themselves. In the most
common situation, the trustee court exercises fiduciary
responsibilities with respect to the constitution, in the name of a
fictitious entity: the sovereign People.
In such systems, political elites-members of the parties, the
executive, the legislature-are never principals in their relationship
these. All 106 of these constitutions contain a catalogue of rights, and 101 provide for rights
review by a supreme or constitutional court. It seems that the last constitution to leave rights
out was the racist 1983 South African constitution, hardly a model to emulate.
28. STONE SWEET, supra note 1, at 37.
29. For an extended discussion, see Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutions and Judicial
Power, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS 217-39 (Daniele Caramani ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
30. See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy, 25
W. EUR. POL. 77 (2002), (building on the contributions of Giandomenico Majone, Two
Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, 2 EUR. UNION
POL. 103 (2001) and Terry Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.
L. ECON & ORG. 213 (1990)).
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to constitutional judges. 31  Elected officials may seek to overturn
decisions or restrict the court's powers, and they may seek to
influence the court in other ways (e.g., through appointments). As a
formal matter, however, in order to reverse the court, they would
have to succeed in amending the constitution. The decision rules
governing constitutional revision, however, are usually more
restrictive than those governing the revision of legislation, and
amendment procedures may involve other actors outside of their
control. In many of the states under consideration in this paper, for
example, amendment of rights provisions is a practical or legal
impossibility; and in the EU and the WTO, the decision-rule
governing treaty-amendment is unanimity of the Member States.
Modern constitutionalism is characterized by structural
judicial supremacy, where the principals have, in effect, transferred a
bundle of significant "political property rights" to judges, for an
indefinite duration. Structural supremacy is a purely formal
construct; it varies by degrees across systems, and nothing in the
notion tells us anything about how judges will actually exercise their
powers. However, institutionalized supremacy means that the
outcomes produced through constitutional adjudication will be
inflexible, "being more or less immune to change except through
adjudication," so long as some minimally robust conception of
precedent exists.32 In such a situation, judges have every interest in
building doctrine-argumentation frameworks-capable of being
decoupled from specific policy outcomes.
D. Balancing, Argumentation, Proportionality
One of our claims is that PA has provided an important
doctrinal underpinning 33 for the rights-based expansion of judicial
31. In practice, some elected officials participate in some of functions usually
associated with principals, such as appointment. Nonetheless, they are more often merely
"players" within the rule structures provided by the constitution. They compete with each
other in order to be in the position to legislate, among other things.
32. Stone Sweet, Path Dependence, Precedent, and Judicial Power, in ON LAW,
POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION, supra note 19, at 112, 120.
33. We recognize that many academic lawyers and social scientists are deeply
suspicious of purely doctrinal explanations of the evolution of legal systems. Our
explanation relies on doctrine being conceptualized in a particular way, namely, as a
discursive frame for norm-based argumentation that enables the litigating parties and the
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authority across the globe. In the rest of this paper, we will portray it
as a type of operating system that constitutional judges employ in
pursuit of two overlapping, general goals:
* to manage potentially explosive environments, given the
politically sensitive nature of rights review.
" to establish, and then reinforce, the salience of
constitutional deliberation and adjudication within the
greater political system.
PA provides basic materials for achieving both objectives, in a
relatively standardized, easy-to-use form. Under conditions of
supremacy and a steady case load, a trustee court has powerful
reasons to seek to draw the major actors in the polity into the
processes it governs, and to induce them to use the modes of
deliberation that it curates. Insofar as they do, political elites will
help to legitimize the court and its doctrines, despite or because of
controversy about supremacy.
1. Balancing
A basic task of constitutional judges is to resolve intra-
constitutional conflict: legal disputes in which each party pleads a
constitutional norm or value against the other. Where the tension
between two interests of constitutional rank cannot be interpreted
away, a court could develop a conflict rule that would determine
which interest prevails. In fact, most judges are loath to build intra-
constitutional hierarchies of norms. Instead, they typically announce
that no right is absolute, which thrusts them into a balancing mode.
When it comes to constitutional adjudication, balancing can
never be dissociated from lawmaking: it requires judges to behave as
legislators do, or to sit in judgment of a prior act of balancing
performed by elected officials. We nonetheless argue that the move
to balancing offers important advantages. Consider the alternatives.
A court could declare that rights are absolute, or that one right must
always prevail over other constitutional values, including other rights
provisions. Creating such hierarchies would, in effect,
constitutionalize winners and losers. Further, we know of no
defensible procedure for doing so other than freezing in place a prior
judge to bridge the domain of law and the domain of interest-based conflict.
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act of balancing: insofar as judges gave reasons for having conferred
a higher status on one value relative to another, they have in fact
balanced. A court could also generate precedent-based covering
rules for determining when a right is or is not in play, or under what
circumstances one interest prevails against another. The procedure
cannot save the court from charges that it legislates or balances. On
the contrary, such a court dons the mantle of the supreme legislator
whose self-appointed task is to elaborate what is, in effect, a
constitutional code.
A court that explicitly acknowledges that balancing inheres in
rights adjudication is a more honest court than one that claims that it
only enforces a constitutional code, but neither balances nor makes
law. It also makes itself better off strategically, relative to
alternatives. The move to balancing makes it clear: (a) that each
party is pleading a constitutionally-legitimate norm or value; (b) that,
a priori, the court holds each of these interests in equally high
esteem; (c) that determining which value shall prevail in any given
case is not a mechanical exercise, but is a difficult judicial task
involving complex policy considerations; and (d) that future cases
pitting the same two legal interests against one another may well be
decided differently, depending on the facts.
2. Argumentation Frameworks
In balancing situations, it is context that varies, and it is the
judge's reading of context-the circumstances, fact patterns, and
policy considerations at play in any case-that determines outcomes.
A balancing court can, nevertheless, give some measure of coherence
to adjudication by developing stable procedures for arriving at
decisions. To the extent that it is successful, these procedures will
take on some of the systematizing functions of precedent more
broadly.
Our focus in this paper is on a particular type of procedure, an
"argumentation framework." These are discursive structures that
organize (a) how litigants plead their interests, and how they engage
their opponent's arguments, and (b) how courts frame their decisions.
Following Sartor, such frameworks embody a series of inference
34. Giovanni Sartor, A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation, 7 RATIO JURIS 177
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steps, represented by a statement justified by reasons (or inference
rules) that lead to a conclusion. In balancing situations, such
frameworks incorporate inconsistency-that is, argumentation-to
the extent that each inference step offers both a defensible argument
and counter argument, from which contradictory but defensible
conclusions can be reached. In resolving disputes within these
structures, judges typically choose from a menu of such conclusions.
It is our view that a balancing court seeking to manage its
environment can do no better than to propagate appropriate
argumentation frameworks. Once in place, the court will know, in
advance, how the parties to an intra-constitutional dispute will plead,
and each side will know how the court will proceed to its decisions.
Under conditions of supremacy (given a steady case load), fidelity on
the part of the court to a particular framework will entrench that
mode of argumentation as constitutional doctrine. To the extent that
arguing outside of the framework is ineffective, skilled legal actors
will use the framework, thereby reproducing and legitimizing it.
3. Proportionality
PA is an argumentation framework, seemingly tailor-made for
dealing with intra-constitutional tensions, that is, the indeterminacy
of rights adjudication. The framework clearly indicates to litigating
parties the type and sequence of arguments that can and must be
made, and the path through which the judges will reason to their
decision. Along this path, PA provides ample occasion for the
balancing court to express its respect, even reverence, for the relative
positions of each of the parties. This latter point is crucial. In
situations where the judges cannot avoid declaring a winner, they can
at least make a series of ritual bows to the losing party. Indeed, the
court that moves to balancing stricto senso is stating, in effect, that
each side has some significant constitutional right on its side, but that
the court must, nevertheless, make a decision. The court can then
credibly claim that it shares some of the loser's distress in the
outcome.
(1994). For a fuller discussion, see Stone Sweet, supra note 30.
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E. The Structure of Constitutional Rights
In contemporary rights adjudication, balancing holds sway for
three basic reasons. First, rights provisions are relatively open-ended
norms, that is, they are both indeterminate and in danger of being
construed in an inflexible and partisan manner. As discussed, judges
have good reasons to formalize a balancing procedure, and to impose
this on litigating parties. PA is such a formalization.
Second, most post-World War II constitutions state
unambiguously that most rights provisions are not absolute but,
rather, are capable of being limited by another value of constitutional
rank. In fact, limitation clauses are the norm. Take the following
examples:
" In Germany (1949), article 2.1 of the Basic Law (GG)
states that "everyone shall have the right to the free
development of her personality insofar as she does not
violate the rights of others or offend the constitutional
order or moral code."
" In the Spanish Constitution of 1978, article 20.1.a
proclaims the right to free expression, which article 20.4
then "delimits" with reference to "other rights, including
personal honor and privacy." Article 33.1 declares the
right to private property, while article 33.3 provides for the
restriction of property rights for "public benefit," as
determined by statute.
" Section 1 of the Canadian Constitution Act (1982) declares
that: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
* Article 17 of the Charter of Rights of the Czech Republic
(1993) states: "freedom of expression and the right to seek
and disseminate information may be limited by law in the
case of measures essential in a democratic society for
protecting the rights and freedoms of others, the security
of the State, public security, public health, and morality."
" In South Africa (1996), the extensive Bill of Rights is
followed by section 36.1, announcing that:
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The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited
only in terms of law of general application to the
extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking
into account all relevant factors, including the
nature of the right; the importance of the purpose
of the limitation; the nature and extent of the
limitation; the relation between the limitation and
its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve
the purpose."
In each of these settings (see infra Part IV), constitutional judges
have adopted PA to manage the intra-constitutional conflicts
associated with rights. Put differently, judges do not develop
doctrines that enable them to "enforce" limitation clauses; a law is
struck down when it fails the test of proportionality. In Canada,
judges apply the LRM test when they are asked to enforce the
"reasonable limits" prescription of Article 1 of the Constitution Act.
In South Africa, LRM testing is required by the Bill of Rights itself,
but the founders based this provision on a prior ruling of the
Constitutional Court to adopt proportionality as an overarching
principle of rights adjudication. 35 Across post-1989 Central Europe,
PA is automatically activated whenever the "necessity," or
"essential" nature, or "reasonableness," of governmental measures is
challenged under a rights provision.
A third reason: many modem constitutions (or constitutional
theory or doctrine) require state organs, including the legislature and
the executive, to work to protect or enhance the enjoyment of rights.
It is a core function of constitutional and supreme courts to supervise
this activity. In such situations, governments will develop arguments
to the effect that their measures are not opposed to rights, but in fact
stand-in for a specific right. The classic conflict-between right X
and the will of the "majority" as expressed in a statute-is recast, as
one between right X and a government action designed to facilitate
the development or enjoyment of right Y. Courts can, and often do,
interpret these disputes as tensions between two rights. Apart from
adopting a formal balancing framework such as PA, we do not see
35. S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 436 (S. Afr.). See infra Part
IV.A.2.
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how a court could position itself better to deal with such cases.
1. The Trustee Court and Rights Adjudication
The move to proportionality generates what we earlier called
a "second-order" legitimacy problem, in that it fully exposes the
lawmaking capacities of the rights-protecting judge.
The point has been made forcefully by Hans Kelsen, the
founder of the modem constitutional court, and of another important
strain of positivism. In his constitutional theory, Kelsen focused on
the legal system as a hierarchy of norms, which judges are enlisted to
defend as a means of securing the system's validity and legitimacy.
In the inter-war years, Kelsen labored to rationalize constitutional
review, in the face of longstanding political hostility to sharing power
with judges. Most important, he distinguished what legislators and
constitutional judges do, when they make law. 36  Parliaments are
"positive legislators," since they make law freely, subject only to
constitutional constraints (rules of procedure). Constitutional judges,
on the other hand, are "negative legislators," whose legislative
authority is restricted to the annulment of a statute when it conflicts
with the constitutional law.37 The distinction between the positive
and the negative legislator rests on the absence, within the
constitutional law, of enforceable rights. Although this fact is
ignored by his modem-day followers, Kelsen explicitly warned of the
"dangers" of providing for rights of constitutional rank, which he
equated with natural law. 38 The court that sought to protect rights
would inevitably obliterate the distinction between the "negative"
and the "positive" legislator.39 Through their quest to discover the
36. Hans Kelsen, La Garantie Juridictionnelle de la Constitution, 45 REVUE DU DROIT
PUBLIC 197 (1928).
37. Stone Sweet, Constitutional Judicial Review, in ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICIALIZATION, supra note 19, at 147.
38. Id.
39. Kelsen, supra note 36, at 221-41. Kelsen wrote:
Sometimes constitutions themselves may refer to [natural law] principles,
which invoke the ideals of equity, justice, liberty, equality, morality, etc.,
without in the least defining [precisely] what are meant by these terms .... But
with respect to constitutional justice, these principles can play an extremely
dangerous role. A court could interpret these constitutional provisions, which
invite the legislator to honor the principles of justice, equity, equality ... as
positive requirements for the [substantive] content of laws.
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content and scope of rights, constitutional judges would, inevitably in
his view, become super-legislators.
The passage to new constitutionalism proved Kelsen right: a
rights-protecting, trustee court is a positive legislator whose
discretionary lawmaking authority, at least on paper, is potentially
limitless. But the context for Kelsen's arguments has radically
changed (Part IV). After World War II, rights and constitutional
review became central to the very idea of constitutionalism. In most
places with new constitutions, it would be a relatively simple matter
to defend judicial supremacy from the standpoint of delegation
theory: a political commitment to rights requires massive delegation
to judges; and, if the judges do their jobs properly, they will at times
impinge upon policy processes and outcomes. One could also argue
that, under the new constitutionalism, there is no legitimacy problem,
since the constitution itself expressly provides for rights, rights
review, and the structural supremacy of the constitutional judge in
certain (policy-relevant) processes. What is interesting is that neither
argument has succeeded in shutting down the controversy that
attends supremacy or what judges do with it. We discuss the politics
of PA further in Part V.
F. Balancing as Optimization
Robert Alexy's book, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, is
arguably the most important and influential work of constitutional
theory written in the last fifty years. Alexy develops a "structural
theory" of rights and proportionality balancing in light of the case
law of the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC). 40 But the
theory has far wider application, since it speaks directly to major
issues raised by the new constitutionalism, and in this paper. At this
point in time, Alexy's ideas constitute the basic conceptual
foundations of PA. In this brief section, we briefly highlight some of
the claims Alexy makes, focusing on concepts to be used further
along in the paper.
For our purposes, Alexy makes two original contributions.
First, he distinguishes between rules and principles and then
40. ALEXY, supra note 13, at 13-18.
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conceptualizes principles as "optimization requirements.' Rules
"contain fixed points in the field of the factually and legally
possible," that is, a rule is a norm that is either "fulfilled or not."
4 2
For Alexy, principles, such as those contained in rights provisions,
are norms that "require that something be realized to the greatest
extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. The
distinction makes a difference in adjudication. A conflict between
two rules can be resolved through giving primacy to, invalidating, or
establishing an "appropriate exception" to, one of the rules, in
relation to the other. A conflict between two principles, however,
can only be managed through balancing-the judge finds that one
principle outweighs the other, given a particular set of circumstances.
Alexy's account of rights yields a stipulation to the effect that rights
have an inherent, non-rule-like quality. On their own, outside of a
particular context of disputation or argumentation, rights do not tell
us how they are to be actualized (whereas a speed limit rule contains
such criteria, on its own). The scope of the "legally possible"-
which sets boundary conditions to the optimization process-is
determined by the opposition between principles, which is itself
embedded in the specifics of a conflict. "Conflicts of rules are
played out at the level of validity," Alexy argues, whereas
"competitions between principles are played out in the dimension of
weight," given a specific context.
45
If rights are "optimization requirements," binding on all
public (and in some cases, private) authorities, then rights
adjudication (and therefore lawmaking more generally) reduces to
46balancing. Further, the purpose of balancing must be both to
resolve alleged conflicts between principles, and to aid all of the
organs of the state in their task of optimizing rights and other
countervailing principles properly.
Alexy's second major contribution follows from his
construction of balancing as a kind of meta-constitutional rule
41. Id. at 44-61.
42. Id. at 47-48.
43. Id. at 47.
44. Rather than being a fixed property of the norms themselves (in the abstract, they
are of equal weight).
45. ALEXY, supra note 13, at 50.
46. "Constitutions with constitutional rights are attempts simultaneously to organize
collective action and secure individual rights." Id. at 425.
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(Alexy does not use that phrase; in our view, he presupposes PA and
balancing as a Grundnorm). A conflict between principles places
judges under a duty to balance and to optimize. Although we now
skip a number of steps in the argument, Alexy theorizes the necessity
prong of PA-the LRM test-in terms of Pareto optimality.
47
Accordingly, there can be no defensible justification for allowing a
public authority to infringe more on a right than is necessary for it to
realize any second principle, given that the right could be optimized:
the bearer of the right could be made better off if the government
were to choose less onerous means. Optimization is also built into
Alexy's "law of balancing," which governs the "proportionality in
the narrow sense" phase of PA: "The greater the degree of non-
satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the
importance of satisfying the other."
4
Although Alexy provides a rationalization of balancing as a
procedure, he acknowledges that the question of what relative weight
judges should give to opposed principles, in any given dispute, falls
completely outside the theory. In our view, any proponent of PA
must admit that the move to proportionality balancing reveals, rather
than disguises, Kelsen's positive legislator, the rights-protecting,
trustee court. Alexy can nonetheless claim, as we have, that PA
generates a particular form of argumentation, and places the judge
under an obligation to justify her decisions in terms of certain
constraints. 50  Thus, to the extent that judges actually search for
Pareto-optimal solutions (the necessity phase) and actually seek to
comply with the law of balancing (the final balancing phase), PA is
less vulnerable to the charge that it proceeds in the absence of
rational criteria, and is no more than a means to package a court's
(unconstrained) policy choices.
From the point of view of 2-against- 1 and judicial lawmaking,
it should be obvious that rulings that conform to the law of balancing,
or can be portrayed as falling on some point along a Pareto frontier,
will be more palatable than those that are not Pareto-optimal. From a
broader-based political economy perspective, such rulings enable
judges to deal with conflicts between (a) those social interests that
47. Id. at 399.
48. Id. at 102.
49. Id. at 100, 105.
50. As Alexy notes, the law of balancing is "not valueless... [but] identifies what is
significant in balancing exercises." Id. at 105.
2008]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W
are likely to lose the most and (b) those social interests standing to
gain the most, from any new allocation of collective goods being
produced by the government measure under review. The court, in
effect, is stating that it took every pain to minimize the negative
consequences of its ruling for the losing party or interest: the right or
interest or value being pleaded by the loser requires as much. If the
judges do so, then it will always be possible for some observers to
claim that the policy effects of their rulings are an inevitable by-
product of adjudicating rights claims, rather than outcomes that
judges seek to impose on the polity. After all, the policy context-
and the menu of options available to the court-were generated by
the parties, not the court.
Finally, an active rights adjudicator that balances, works to
optimize, and generally seeks to follow the "law of balancing" will
tend to push policy outcomes to the partisan center. It will do so to
the extent that it eliminates extreme measures that might be pursued
by political parties with reformist agendas. And it will do so in so far
as the judicial move to PA affects, or colonizes, legislative and
administrative space, by inducing policymakers to assess the
proportionality of their own decision making in an ongoing way. If
PA does make partisan politics more consensual over time, then that
fact is likely to mitigate the legitimacy dilemmas on which we have
focused here. 51
G. Summary
Our argument to this point rests on two logics that are
separate in principle, but are inseparable in practice. First, at least in
theory, PA can help judges respond to a set of acute overlapping
dilemmas, related to 2-against- 1, lawmaking, and judicial supremacy.
Second, PA fits the structure of rights provisions in a world
dominated by the precepts of the "new constitutionalism." Most
important, new constitutions proclaim rights and then immediately
provide for legitimate exceptions to them, in the guise of various
constitutionally-recognized public interests. Intra-constitutional
conflicts are inevitable in such systems, hence extensive delegation to




constitutional judges.52 In our view, the two logics will typically
overlap in rights adjudication. Our explanation thus blends
"political" (or "strategic") and "legal" (or norm-governed) factors
and logics, theorized in particular ways.
III. THE GERMAN GENEALOGY
The German Basic Law (1949) established a system of
constitutional justice that not only transformed German law, politics,
and state theory, but has impacted heavily on the development of
constitutionalism across the globe. The GFCC has been the main
agent of these changes. Our concern is with one contribution of the
German experience to global constitutionalism: the emergence of PA
as a formal procedure for dealing with rights claims.53 We trace the
antecedents of the proportionality framework back two centuries, to a
corner of German administrative law-police law (Polizeirecht). In
the second half of the nineteenth century, as the scope of the
administrative state expanded, elements of PA, notably the LRM test,
emerged as a core administrative law principle. Proportionality then
migrated to the constitutional law in the 1950s and, under the tutelage
of the GFCC, developed into the expansive balancing framework.
52. One could also portray the second logic in strictly formal terms: the structure of
modem rights provisions necessarily implies PA. Judges, however, have choices in how
best to manage rights-based, intra-constitutional conflict-they were not required to adopt
PA.
53. A generic idea of proportionality-the principle that there must be at least some
minimal "fit" between actions and consequences, or between ends and means in law-has
deep roots in all domains of German law. See generally Franz Wieacker, Geschichtliche
Wurzeln des Prinzips der verhdltnismaj3igen Rechtsanwendung, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ROBERT
FISCHER 867-69 (Marcus Lutter, Walter Stimpel, & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 1997). The
idea is reflected in several provisions of the Civil Code, the private law codification that
went into effect at the turn of the twentieth century, and in criminal law doctrines of long
standing. These latter include the mandate that the punishment fit the crime, and the
doctrine of extra-statutory necessity, according to which an otherwise criminal act can be
justified when the act is necessary to avoid a greater harm. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB]
[Penal Code], May 15, 1871, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] 127, as amended, § 34 (concerning
proportionate punishment), § 62 (concerning extra-statutory necessity); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 779-83 (2000) (discussing judicial antecedents of
StGB § 34).
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A. From Scholars to Judges
Scholars proposed an embryonic version of PA in the late
eighteenth century, when they began to contemplate new forms of
state intervention and, therefore, the prospect of regular conflict
between public purposes and individual freedoms. The doctrinal area
where this conflict was first seriously theorized was the developing
field of Polizeirecht. In contemporary usage, Polizeirecht54 denotes
the law applicable to the police force,55 but two centuries ago, the
term had a much broader meaning. It subsumed measures designed
to promote the public welfare, morality, and public safety,
encompassing nearly the whole of the state's (then fairly primitive)
interventions in society.
56
Leading legal and political thinkers sought to ground the
legitimacy of police interventions on stable principles capable of
mediating the conflict between private autonomy and the public
good. The conflict was taken seriously because private autonomy
was highly valued in the social contractarian theories that
undergirded public law thinking in late eighteenth century
Germany. 57  In the view of jurists such as Carl Gottlieb Svarez
(1746-98), individuals possessed natural rights that were permanent
and prior to the state, but they had given up some of their freedom in
order to realize collective goods, through the state.58 The social
54. Today, the scope of Polizeirecht is evoked loosely by the phrase "police power."
For a classic American statement of the "police power," see Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.,
201 N.Y. 271 (1911).
55. See CHRISTOPH Gusy, POLIZEIRECHT 132-33 (2003). Police law governs, for
instance, the cooperation of the police with other authorities.
56. STEPHANIE HEINSOHN, DER OFFENTLICHRECHTLICHE GRUNDSATZ DER
VERHAkLTNISMA SSIGKEIT 14 (1997); RUPPRECHT VON KRAuSS, DER GRUNDSATZ DER
VERHALTNISMASSIGKEIT IN SEINER BEDEUTUNG FOR DIE NOTWENDIGKEIT DES MITTELS IN
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 7 (1955).
57. See Fritz Ossenbiihl, Maflhalten mit dem Gbermaj3verbot, in WEGE UND
VERFAHREN DES VERFASSUNGSLEBENS: FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER LERCHE ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG 151, 152 (Peter Badura & Rupert Scholz eds., 1993); see also HEINSOHN,
supra note 56, at 9.
58. In Svarez's words: "The rights of command in a state or a ruler cannot be derived
from an unmediated divine blessing, or from the right of the stronger, but they must be
derived from a contract, through which the citizens of the state have made themselves
subject to the order of the ruler for the advancement of their own common happiness."
CARL GOTTLIEB SVAREZ,VORTRAGE OBER RECHT UND STAAT (Hermann Conrad & Gerd.
Kleinheyer eds., Westdeutscher Verlag 1960), quoted in BARBARA REMMERT,




contract justified the state's authority, but also fixed the outer bounds
of that authority. Proportionality was given a central place in these
early theories of the police power, as a standard governing the
legality of state measures. In the words of Gfinther Heinrich von
Berg (1765-1843): 59  "The first law ... is this: the police power
may go no farther than its own goals require. The police law may
abridge the natural freedom of the subject, but only insofar as a
lawful goal requires as much. This is its second law.",60
Berg's laws capture the essence of the suitability and LRM
tests: the police may invade citizens' freedoms only in the service of
lawful goals, and their measures may restrict those freedoms no more
than necessary. The third distinctive element of PA-balancing in
the strict sense-was also recognized in the eighteenth century. In
his treatise, Lectures on the State and Law, Svarez described the
balancing exercise, but insisted that it proceed with a thumb on the
scale in favor of rights:
Only the achievement of a weightier good for the
whole can justify the state in demanding from an
individual the sacrifice of a less substantial good. So
long as the difference in weights is not obvious, the
natural freedom must prevail .... The [social]
hardship, which is to be averted through the restriction
of the freedom of the individual, has to be more
substantial by a wide margin than the disadvantage to
the individual or the whole that results from the
infringement.
6 1
Although jurists had thus already devised a proportionality
test for the legitimacy of state intervention in private freedoms before
1800, it is important to note that PA was not yet being deployed as a
constraint on state action. It would be many decades before the
59. Thomas Wirtenberger, Der Schutz vom Eigentum und Freiheit im ausgehenden 18.
Jahrhundert, in, ZUR IDEEN-UND REZEPTIONSGESCHICHTE DES PREUSSISCHES ALLGEMEINEN
LANDRECHTS 55, 63 (Walter Gose & Thomas Wdirtenberger eds., 1999). Von Berg was the
first scholar to use the phrase "disproportionate" in the context of police law. See Klaus
Stem, Zur Entstehung und Ableitung des Ubermnaj3verbots, in WEGE UND VERFAHREN DES
VERFASSUNGSLEBENS: FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER LERCHE ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 165, 168
(Peter Badura & Rupert Scholz eds., 1993).
60. Wiirtenberger, supra note 59, at 63.
61. CARL GOTTLIEB SVAREZ,VORTRLAGE OBER RECHT UND STAAT 40 (Hermann Conrad
& Gerd Kleinheyer eds., Westdeutscher Verlag 1960), quoted in Wiirtenberger, supra note
59, at 62.
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judicial review of administrative acts would appear in any of the
62German states. Svarez, who presented his arguments in lectures
delivered to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, the later King
Friedrich Wilhelm III, was in effect proposing a principle that the
state should adopt for its conduct; he was not describing positive
law. 63 However, in his role as the drafter for Prussia's massive legal
codification, the Prussian General Law of 1794 (Allgemeines
64Landrecht (ALR)), Svarez also provided an important textual
"hook" for proportionality's later doctrinal development. The
provision concerning police powers, Article 10 II 17 ALR, reads:
"The office of the police is to take the necessary measures for the
maintenance of public peace, security, and order .... 65 As
described below, this clause would ultimately provide the foundation
for an early proportionality doctrine, once the new administrative
courts took it upon themselves to review the "necessity" of
administrative measures almost a century later.
Throughout the nineteenth century, scholars continued to
reiterate and refine proportionality-based standards for the exercise of
police power, 66 and these ideas were finally given agency with the
establishments of administrative courts. 6 7  The most important of
these courts, Prussia's Oberverwaltungsgericht, or Higher
Administrative Court, began operating in 1875.68 Fed by a steady
stream of cases, the court quickly gained a reputation across
Germany as the leading expositor of administrative law principles.
69
62. Wiurtenberger, supra note 59, at 64-65, 67. The first was Baden in 1863; the
second was Prussia in 1875.
63. HEINSOHN, supra note 56, at 8-14.
64. Stem, supra note 59, at 168.
65. Allgemeines Landrecht fir die preuBischen Staaten [A.L.R.], Feb. 5, 1794, § 10 II
17.
66. Perhaps the most significant figure in the mid-nineteenth century was Robert von
Mohl, whose concepts of "objective disproportionality" and "subjective proportionality"
anticipated proportionality in the narrow sense and the necessity principle, respectively.
ROBERT VON MOHL, III POLIZEI-WISSENSCHAFT 40 (1844), discussed in HEINSOHN, supra
note 56, at 33-34. While von Mohl built on the work of earlier jurists, he grounded
proportionality not in natural rights theory, as Suarez had done, but in rule of law concepts.
For a fuller description of the broader theoretical underpinnings of nineteenth century public
law thinkers, see REMMERT, supra note 58, at 52-98.
67. HEINSOHN, supra note 56, at 31; KRAUSS, supra note 56, at 3.
68. Wiirtenberger, supra note 59, at 65, 67; Preul3ischen Verwaltungsgerichtsgesetz
[Prussian Administrative Court Act], July 3 1875, PreuBische Gesetzsammlung 1875 at 375.




By the 1880s, it was employing the "necessary measures" clause of
70the 1794 ALR to annul police measures on LRM grounds. Thus,
by the late nineteenth century, German administrative courts were
striking down police actions that violated proportionality, which was
conceptualized at that time as an enforceable LRM test.
71
By the end of the nineteenth century, the principle of
proportionality enjoyed a secure place in administrative law, both in
72judicial decisions and scholarly treatises . In the decades that
followed, the activities of the regulatory state expanded, especially at
the state level, and litigation of administrative acts increased, to
which judges responded by applying a LRM test. As noted, judges
initially seemed to regard proportionality primarily in LRM terms,
but courts did not always distinguish between the various ways that
administrative measures might be disproportionate.73 Over time,
balancing was also contemplated and employed, but the practice was
far from uniform. 74
70. Two examples will suffice by way of illustrating the early case law. In an 1886
case, the court ruled that the police could not require, on public safety grounds, a landowner
to remove a post erected at the edge of his property. Rather, all that was necessary to protect
the public was requiring the landowner to light the post after dark. As the court explained,
"[t]he protection from accidents.., is indeed the task of the police; this task and the
authority finds its limit, however, in that the chosen measures may not extend farther than
they must to meet the goal of eliminating the danger." PreuBisches Oberverwaltungsgericht
[PrOVG] [Prussian Higher Administrative Court] July 3, 1886, 13 Entscheidungen des
preuBischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts [PrOVGE] 426, 427. That same year, the court ruled
that it was disproportionate, and hence, impermissible for the police to close down a shop in
response to the shop owner's distribution of brandy without a license. The operation of the
shop was itself not unlawful; only the distribution of brandy was. And so closing the shop
was a more drastic step than the police needed to take to meet the legitimate goal of
enforcing the license requirement. PrOVG April 10, 1886, 13 PrOVGE 424, 425.
71. Administrative courts in the other German states soon began following Prussia's
lead, striking down police measures on LRM grounds. Stem, supra note 59, at 168.
72. See LOTHAR HIRSCHBERG, DER GRUNDSATZ DER VERHALTNISMASSIGKEIT 4 n.20, 5
n.21 (1980) for case and treatise citations. Leading administrative law scholar Otto Mayer
wrote at some length about proportionality in police law and in fact popularized the term
"proportionality." See OTTO MAYER, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 267, 351 (1895); see
also George Frumkin, A Survey of the Sources of the Principle of Proportionality in German
Law 29 (1991) (unpublished thesis, Univ. of Chicago) (on file with authors). Fritz Fleiner
also captured the gist of proportionality with his memorable aphorism "The police should
not shoot at sparrows with cannons." FRITZ FLEINER, INSTITUTIONEN DES DEUTSCHEN
VERWALTUNGSRECHTS 404 (1928); see also Thomas Henne, Mit Kanonen auf Spatzen
schiefien: Ein Beitrag Fritz Fleiners zur deutschen Juristensprache, 16 DEUTSCHES
VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1094 (2002) (tracing the history of this metaphor).
73. See HIRSCHBERG, supra note 72, at 6.
74. The diversity of views is illustrated by a pair of 1929 cases concerning the same
provision, § 127 of the Criminal Procedure Law [StPO]. That provision authorized citizens
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Constitutional rights review proved to be more problematic.
Although the constitutions of most German states did contain bills of
rights in the later nineteenth century, courts did not enforce those
rights as trumps against otherwise legal state action. During the
1875-1918 period, administrative review had become in some
respects "a functional substitute for a lack of constitutional
review," 75 and administrative judges routinely invoked rights, in the
form of principles binding on the executive. But statutes were, at
least technically, immune from judicial control.
The Weimar Constitution (1919-33) established a republic. It
also contained a catalogue of "rights"-perhaps better described as a
list of programmatic aspirations, since they could be overridden by
ordinary statute. Nonetheless, in the 1920s, with political authority
weak and divided, judges waged what legal historian Michael Stolleis
has termed a reactionary "war" on politicians, triggered by takings
76
and debt cases. From 1921, the Reichsgericht (the Supreme Court)
claimed for itself the authority to review the conformity of statutes
with basic rights, especially property rights, which it characterized as
"sacred.",77  At the same time, leading jurists-including Carl
Schmitt, Heinrich Triepel, Rudolf Smend, and the young Gerhard
Leibholz-began to theorize rights as the foundational basis of all
constitutional legality. Much of this scholarship was conservative
to detain fleeing criminal suspects. In the case before the Hamburg Oberlandesgericht, a
motorist, (wrongly) believing the driver of an oncoming car to be using his headlights
improperly, drove his car into the path of the other vehicle to force it to stop. In the case
before the Jena Oberlandesgericht, a hunter encountered a trespasser who then fled; unable
to force the man to stop, the hunter shot and wounded him. In both instances, the question
was whether the defendants' conduct fell within what was permissible under § 127. To
address the question, the court in Hamburg adopted a balancing analysis, asking whether the
defendant's dangerous action-the only way he could have stopped the other driver-stood
"in a correct relationship to the interests of catching the wrongdoer." Urteil vom 25.3.1929,
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 58 Juristische Wochentschrift 2842 (1929). The court in Jena,
on the other hand, expressly rejected any "interest balancing" (Giiterabwigung): the
question is merely whether less restrictive means were available to stop the trespasser. As
less restrictive means were not available, the shooting was permissible. Urteil vom
31.5.1929, Jena Oberlandesgericht, 58 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3324 (1929). These
cases may represent an unusual circumstance, in that they involve ordinary citizens
exercising police powers, but they do indicate that balancing was at least contemplated in
proportionality analysis.
75. Michael Stolleis, Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional
Review in the Weimar Republic, 16 RATIO JURIS 266, 270 (2003).
76. Id. at 273. See also 4 DOKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE
1918-33 at 36 (Ernst Rudolf Huber ed., 1992).
77. Stolleis, supra note 75, at 272.
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and anti-parliamentarian, but not all of it. Triepel and Smend, at
least, considered the capacities of rights to "integrate" state and
society, and to reduce social tensions among classes and factions.
They argued that rights were best understood as a system of
"legalized values," and that these values ought to infuse all of the
constitutional law, and to impose positive duties on government.
Smend renewed his efforts after 1945, and Leibholz, who joined the
first GFCC in 1951, worked hard to have the Court adopt these
ideas.78
Had the Weimar Republic survived, it is at least possible that
the Supreme Court would have generated a rights-oriented
jurisprudence with proportionality doctrines at its core. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Switzerland did take steps in that direction during
this same period. In 1926, the Swiss Supreme Court noted, in dicta,
that health regulations infringing the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of trade and manufacturing more than necessary to protect
the public were unjustifiable. 79
In Germany, however, the advent of the Third Reich mooted
the question, as judicial review came under attack from the Nazis and
their new doctrinal establishment. 80  Labeling a state measure
78. See FRIEDER GUNTHER, DENKEN VOM STAAT HER: DIE BUNDESDEUTSCHE
STAATSRECHTSLEHRE ZWISCHEN DEZISION UND INTEGRATION, 1949-70, 190-91 (2004).
79. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] Sept. 24, 1926, 52 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] I 222 (F.R.G.). The case concerned a challenge to
an order by health authorities in the canton of Zug, who banned the sale of a non-medicinal
udder salve for cows on the ground that farmers might misuse it, and avoid seeking medical
treatment for serious udder problems. The Court held that the ban was not authorized under
Zug's regulation for licensing the sale of medications, and further observed that, if the
regulation could be read so expansively as to authorize the ban, then the regulation would
violate the right to free trade and manufacture, as guaranteed in section 31 of the 1874
Constitution. Section 31 includes reservations that permit some economic regulation. The
Court characterized the catch-all reservation clause for section 31 as permitting limitations
on free trade "only when they are grounded in the public interest." Id. at 227. Section 31
proscribes regulations that are not in the public interest, but also "those measures that may
well lie in the public interest, but that could be replaced with a less far-reaching measure
[eine weniger weitgehende Massnahme] with equivalent effect. Because in so far [as this is
the case] the farther-reaching infringement is not justified in the common good." Id.
Following the German innovations of the late 1950s, the Swiss Supreme Court began
applying a three-stage form of PA to restrictions on the freedom of trade and manufacturing.
In time, this familiar form of analysis was applied to restrictions on other rights as well. For
a more detailed discussion of Swiss developments, see Beatrice Weber-Dirler, Zur neuesten
Entwicklungen des Verhdltnismdssigkeitsprinzips, in MLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE PIERRE
MOOR 593 (Benoit Bovay & Minh Son Nguyen eds., 2005).
80. MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA: STUDIES ON LEGAL HISTORY
IN NAZI GERMANY 134 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998).
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"political" was usually enough to shield it from judicial review.8 1
B. The Constitutionalization of Proportionality
Drafted under the watchful gaze of occupying forces, the
German Basic Law of 1949 established the Federal Republic as a
new constitutional order grounded in a commitment to human rights
enforceable as higher law. The constitution announces an extensive
catalogue of rights (Articles 1-20) before it constitutes state organs
and governmental arrangements. These rights are binding on the
state (Article 1 § 3); statutes may not interfere with their "essential
content" (Article 19 § 2). The Basic Law also created a
constitutional court, the GFCC, and conferred upon it jurisdiction to
defend those rights, in cooperation with the ordinary courts. The
GFCC statute permitted individuals to bring claims of rights
violations directly to the Court, and this route to judicial redress was
itself constitutionalized in 1969 (Article 93 § 4a).
Immediately, jurists began arguing for the recognition of
proportionality as a constitutional principle. Some, such as Herbert
Krger, 2 were "close associates" or followers of Rudolf Smend, and
Smend's theories about rights and constitutional "integration"
enjoyed a privileged position throughout the 1950s. 83 At the same
time, rights-oriented scholars, such as Gerhard Leibholz, were
appointed to the GFCC. In hindsight, one sees the hugely important
role that legal scholars played in elevating proportionality to a
constitutional principle. They refined the concepts that courts
employed, and provided the rationales for proportionality's
expansion.
Two figures stand out in particular: Rupprecht Krauss and
Peter Lerche. Krauss's influential 1953 dissertation made the case
for treating the balancing test as a fundamental part of the
proportionality principle, and for treating proportionality as a
constitutional principle. Krauss coined the term, "proportionality in
the narrow sense," and presented it as a latent strain already present
81. Id.
82. Kruiger wrote expansively about proportionality's scope already in 1950. See
Herbert Krtger, Die Einschrankung von Grundrechten nach dem Grundgesetz, in 1950
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 625.
83. GONTHER, supra note 78, at 180.
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in the very concept of proportionality. 84 "Starting from the logical
meaning of the word," Krauss reasoned, "[proportionality] is about
relating two or more quantities that can be set against a common
yardstick, that is, that are comparable and fit with each other in a
certain way."' 85  Krauss's insistence that the concept of
proportionality implied a balancing test reflected a heightened
solicitude for rights. He wrote: "if the measure [of legality] is only
necessity [i.e., the least restrictive means test], then a quite negligible
public interest could lead to a severe right infringement, without
being unlawful.",86 Because the Basic Law's rights guarantees were
the defining feature of the new constitutional order, 87 Krauss argued,
proportionality must apply across the board as a check on state
action:
In the face of this constitutional situation it would be a
contradiction to raise personal freedom to the leading
state principle and at the same time to permit
unnecessary restrictions of this freedom by the state to
be considered lawful. It is consequently simply
irreconcilable with the system of the Basic Law that
the executive could be permitted to make incursions
into the private sphere of individuals that go farther
than is absolutely necessary to the reaching of a
permissible end.88
The new constitutional order thus reduces to what amounts to a
constitutional right to proportionality analysis, a point later implied
by Alexy. 
89
Peter Lerche made his contribution as the
constitutionalization of proportionality was underway, in his 1961
dissertation. While Lerche was careful to distinguish between the
least restrictive means test and proportionality in the strict sense, like
Krauss, he argued that the two were logically connected. The least
84. Krauss also cited a Danzig police regulation that limited interventions to those that
were justified on balance, considering the public and private interests at stake, to show that
proportionality "in a narrow sense" was already present in positive law. KRAUSS, supra note
56, at 15.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id. at 15.
87. Krauss linked the robust conception of rights in the Basic Law to the influence of
natural rights thinking. Id. at 39-41.
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id. at 26.
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restrictive means test on its own would be ineffectual, since "any
measures at all could be presented as 'necessary,' if the purpose they
serve is defined in wide enough terms." 90 Proportionality in the strict
sense must be added to the least restrictive means test, "if the
principle of necessity is not to lose all substance." 91 For Lerche,
proportionality's rise to constitutional stature is a function of the
changed character of citizen-state interactions in the modem welfare
state. In contrast to earlier eras, modem legislation has become more
administrative in character, laying out detailed, individualized
regulatory programs (such as the tax code), as opposed to broad,
generally applicable norms.92 Moreover, the arm of the state reaches
far further into the individual's private life than in previous eras.
93
The old, purely formal constraints on legislative legitimacy are
inade9quate to the task of protecting citizens from this transformed
state. 9 Proportionality, developed in an administrative law context
now mirroring the state more broadly, provides a suitably high bar
that lawmakers must clear before infringing individual rights, points
harkening back to Svarez.
From Svarez to Lerche, then, one finds a remarkable
continuity in doctrinal commitment to developing a proportionality-
based account of rights. Though this commitment was undoubtedly
important, the constitutional law of the Federal Republic would
henceforth be fashioned primarily by constitutional judges, not by
doctrinal authority.95  In 1949, the Bavarian Constitutional Court
confronted a case involving article 98, paragraph 2, of that state's
Constitution, which provides that "restrictions [on rights] by statute
are permissible, only when urgently necessary, in the interests of the
security, morals, health and well-being of the public.' 96 The
Bavarian Court held that a LRM test is to be employed if judges are
90. PETER LERCHE, UBERMASS UND VERFASSUNGSRECHT: ZUR BINDUNG DES
GESETZGEBERS AN DIE GRUNDSATZE DER VERHALTNISMASSIGKEIT UND DER
ERFORDERLICHKEIT 20 (1961).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 48-49.
93. Id. at 54.
94. Id. at 54-55.
95. JORN IPSEN, DIETRICH MURSWIEK & BERNHARD SCHLINK STAATSZWECKE IM
VERFASSUNGSTAAT-NACH 40 JAHREN GRUJNDGESETZ: BERICHTE UND DISKUSSIONEN AUF DER
TAGUNG DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATS RECHTSLEHRER (1989).





to control for the "necessity" of state measures, although it cited no
supporting authority for its ruling. 97  In 1956, that same court
explained that it had derived the Proportionality Principle from the
nature of the rights guaranteed in the Bavarian constitution,
combined with the "Rechtsstaat" principle. 98  The GFCC moved
almost as quickly. It initially invoked elements of proportionality on
a case-by-case basis, without citing authority or giving a rationale for
its application. 99 To this day, the Court has not explicated the source
of proportionality. As Dieter Grimm (Justice on the GFCC, 1987-
99) puts it: "The principle was introduced as if it could be taken for
granted." 1
00
By the close of the 1950s, the GFCC had elaborated the
familiar multi-stage framework. In the leading case, Apothekenurteil
(1958), the Court distinguished the LRM test from balancing in the
strict sense for the first time, as separate elements of the
proportionality principle. That case involved a challenge to a
Bavarian law regulating drug stores based on the freedom of
occupation provision of Article 12 1 of the GG. In framing its
analysis, the GFCC focused on the tension between individual rights
and public goals, a tension that demands balancing and a concern for
optimization:
The [purpose of] constitutional right should be to
protect the freedom of the individual [while the
purpose of] the regulation should be to ensure
sufficient protection of societal interests. The
individual's claim to freedom will have a stronger
effect... the more his right to free choice of a
97. Bayerischer Verfassungsgerichtshof [VerfGH Bayern] [Bavarian Constitutional
Court] July 7, 1949, 1 II Entscheidungen des Bayerischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs
[VerfGHE Bayern] 63 (76, 78) (F.R.G.).
98. VerfGH Bayern Dec. 28, 1956, 9 II VerfGHE Bayern 158 (177); see also Stern,
supra note 59, at 171.
99. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court], June 3,
1954, 3 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 383 (399) (F.R.G.)
(holding an electoral law constitutional because it expressed "a suitable means to serve the
goal," and "did not overstep the border which is drawn by the principle of proportionality
between means and ends."). See also Eberhardt Grabitz, Der Grundsatz der
Verhdltnismaiigkeit in der Rechtsprechung der Bundesverfassungsgericht, 98 ARCHIV DES
OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 568, 569 n.l (1973) (detailing earlier precursors of proportionality
analysis in decisions of the GFCC).
100. Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383, 385 (2007).
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profession is put into question; the protection of the
public will become more urgent, the greater the
disadvantages that arise from the free practicing of
professions. When one seeks to maximize both...
demands in the most effective way, then the solution
can only lie in a careful balancing [Abwdgung] of the
meaning of the two opposed and perhaps conflicting
interests. 101
Why did proportionality and balancing take on the
prominence it did at this particular point in time? We cannot answer
the question conclusively, but we would emphasize the following.
First, the Basic Law provided for constitutional rights of a particular
structure, to which PA and balancing were perfectly suited (as argued
in Parts II.C and II.D of this paper). Second, core elements of PA
were native to Germany. All public law scholars and judges would
be familiar with LRM testing; and all private law judges had
experience with balancing, from the German Civil Code. Several
provisions of the Code call for judges to weigh certain interests
against others, most famously sections 138,102 343,103 and 228,104
although none of these provisions require courts to engage in
balancing rights and state interests. Nonetheless, balancing was part
of the broader judicial toolbox, and even public law judges would not
find the analytical structure of balancing wholly alien. The GFCC
has always contained a mixture of judges with private and public law
backgrounds, which also would have facilitated the development of
PA. Third, law professors were not only appointed to the Court, they
also tended to dominate it intellectually. In the 1950s, law professors
untainted by Nazi sympathies (and therefore appointable) would also
101. BVerfG June 11, 1958, 7 BVerfGE 377 (404-05).
102. Section 138, essentially a ban on unconscionable contracts, provides that a legal
transaction is void if "by exploiting the predicament, inexperience, lack of sound judgment,
or considerable weakness of will of another, causes himself or a third party, in exchange for
an act of performance, to be promised or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly
disproportionate to the performance." Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug.
18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] 195, as amended, § 138, 2, translated at
http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch-bgb/indexhtml
103. Section 343 provides that "disproportionately high" liquidated damages can be
reduced to "a reasonable amount," taking into account "every legitimate interest of the
obligee, not merely financial interest." BGB § 343, 1.
. 104. Section 228 provides that a person who damages or destroys another's property
acts lawfully, "if... necessary to ward off the danger [caused by the property] and the
damage is not out of proportion to the danger." BGB § 228. See also BGB § 904.
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have possessed far more prestige than any other high court judge.
Perhaps most important, the new West Germany had firmly
committed to protecting fundamental rights at the highest possible
level, while the prestige of political parties and legislative authority
was relatively low. At the same time, a deep commitment to the
administrative and welfare state, and the demands of post-War
reconstruction, implied an important role for government. Given the
structure of German rights provisions and its own wide jurisdiction,
the GFCC would inevitably confront a vexing question: should a
state measure that passes a LRM test automatically prevail over the
rights they infringe and, if so, on the basis of what theory of rights, or
of the constitution? Even a measure that is narrowly tailored to
achieve a legitimate state purpose may nonetheless infringe more on
an individual's right than is tolerable, given existing constitutional
commitments. In adding a balancing stage, the German Court
avoided having to defend the superiority of a framework that ended
with the LRM test.
If the Court were to justify its move to PA today, we would
argue, it would invoke these considerations: the priority of rights,
given the recent Nazi past; the structure of rights, taking account of
the modem welfare state and commitments to social democracy; and
the rationality of the proportionality principle as a well-theorized
general principle of law that "flows," in Grimm's words, "from the
rule of law or the essence of fundamental rights," 10 5 and confers
basic legitimacy on the system as a whole.
In any event, after Apothekenurteil, the GFCC's invocations
of PA became more confident and the structure of its analysis more
formalized. In 1963, the Court suggested that it would deploy PA to
all cases in which a right is restricted,10 6 and in 1965, it announced,
with no supporting citations, that "in the Federal Republic of
Germany, the principle of proportionality possesses constitutional
status."' 1 7  In 1968, the GFCC declared proportionality to be a
"transcendent standard for all state action" binding all public
105. Grimm, supra note 100, at 386.
106. BVerfG June 10, 1963, 16 BVerfGE 194 (201).
107. BVerfG Dec. 15, 1965, 19 BVerfGE 342 (348-49). In this case, the court found
that a lower court violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights by not considering whether the
pre-trial detention of the plaintiff, a 75-year-old retired admiral charged with murder in
connection with an order he gave during World War II, was consistent with the principle of
proportionality.
2008]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
authorities. 10 8  While, at this time, the Court did not always employ
all the steps of PA to decide a case, especially when proportionality
was only one of the legal issues raised, 109 in subsequent cases it took
care to be explicit about how it would use the different elements of
PA.10 The constitutionalization of proportionality proceeded swiftly
thereafter. 
1
The impact of the GFCC's rights jurisprudence on German
law and politics has been deep and pervasive. For various reasons,
virtually every major policy issue that arises will eventually make it
to the Court, in the form of a rights claim. The voluminous literature
on the "judicialization" of the German legislative process' 1 2 focuses
on the pedagogical authority of the Court's rights jurisprudence in
legislative processes (a politics of anticipatory reaction that takes
place during the legislative process). PA undergirds judicialization,
because it leads the court to put itself in the shoes of policymakers,
and then to walk through their decision-making processes, step-by-
step, evaluating constitutional legality of decisions along the way.
(And when the conduct at issue is not legislative, but a discretionary
act taken within some statutory framework, the court may walk
through the analysis twice: both for the authorizing statute, and for
the discretionary action, either of which could infringe a right.) The
result has been the production of a relatively detailed set of
proscriptions about how legislators and administrators should behave,
if they wish to exercise their authority lawfully in virtually all
important policy domains. In the shadow of proportionality review,
and particularly balancing in the strict sense, German lawmakers
engage in meaningful constitutional deliberation, and systematically
so.
Rights and balancing have also been crucial to the
108. BVerfG Mar. 5, 1968, 23 BVerfGE 127 (133).
109. In the case cited in footnote 108, for instance-a challenge by a Jehovah's Witness
to his punishment for refusing to perform civil service-the court skipped straight to
proportionality in the narrow sense. Id. at 134.
110. BVerfG Jan. 15, 1970, 27 BVerfGE 344 (352).
111. By Eberhart Grabitz's count, by 1973 the FCC had already used proportionality
analysis in 132 cases. Grabitz, supra note 99, at 570 n.3 (1973).
112. The classic study is CHRISTINE LANDFRIED, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT UND
GESETZGEBER (The Federal Constitutional Court and the Legislature) (1984). See also ALEC
STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE, 61-126
(2000); Donald P. Kommers, The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political
System, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 470 (1994); Christine Landfried, Judicial Policymaking in
Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court, 15 W. EUR. POL. 50 (1992).
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"constitutionalization" of the private law, initiated by the GFCC's
ruling in Liith (1958). 113 According to the Court-following the
doctoral dissertation of Giinter Drig' 14-the "value system"
expressed by the Grundgesetz, and in particular its system of rights,
"influences all spheres of law." As a result, "every provision of the
private law (i.e., the various codes, especially the Civil Code) must
be compatible with this system... and every such provision must be
interpreted in its spirit."" 5 Private law judges must do so through
balancing. When they fail to strike a proper balance between rights
and other legal interests, they violate not only "objective
constitutional law," but also the subjective right of the individual.
The ruling created a new cause of action, against the civil law judge,
which the GFCC would hear through the constitutional complaint
procedure. As subsequently developed, the Liith line of
jurisprudence means that "all private law is directly subject to
constitutional rights"-and therefore to balancing-radically
enhancing the presence of constitutional rights, and the GFCC, in
German private law.
IV. DIFFUSION
In this section, we examine how judges, in three national and
three international systems, came to adopt PA. We are interested
here in how judges represent what they are doing when they turn to
PA, and if and how PA gets "constitutionalized" as a meta-principle
of judicial governance. We will not attempt to survey all of the
similarities and differences observed when we examine the use of PA
comparatively, across these systems. One finding deserves emphasis
in advance. In each of the systems examined, judges adopted PA to
deal with the most politically salient, and potentially controversial,
113. BVerfG Jan. 15, 1958, 7 BVerfGE 198.
114. In the 1950s, Drig was the principal proponent of the view that the GG set out "an
objective order of values" that penetrated every aspect of the legal order. See Giinter Drig,
Grundrechte und Zivilrechtsprechung, in VOM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ ZUR
GESAMTDEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNG: FESTSCHRIFT ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG VON HANS NAWIASKY
157 (Theodor Maunz ed. 1956). In its Liith ruling, supra note 113, the GFCC borrowed
heavily from Durig's thesis, which held that constitutional rights applied in private law
relationships, thereby expanding the scope of constitutional balancing in the private law
dramatically. We thank Robert Alexy for alerting us to Dirig's contribution.
115. BVerfG Jan. 15, 1958, 7 BVerfGE 198 (205).
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issues to which they could expect to be exposed. In our view, this is
powerful evidence for arguments made in Part II of this paper.
As important, proportionality's impact has not been confined
to the judiciary. To different degrees across our cases, legislatures
and executives have adapted to the adoption of PA in ways that
reinforce its status as a constitutional commitment. The exact shape
and scope of these developments depend heavily on the particular
institutional structures and legacies onto which PA has been grafted.
A complete account of how non-judicial actors internalize
proportionality into their own decision-making procedures lies
beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is clear that such
internalization can and does occur, with important consequences for
our understanding of "judicial" authority vis ei vis "political"
authority.
A. National Legal Systems
From a comparative law perspective, PA exhibits a viral
quality, spreading relatively quickly from one jurisdiction to another.
In post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe, for example, virtually
every constitutional court has adopted PA on the German model;
most did so all but immediately, citing the case law of the GFCC and
the European Court of Human Rights as authority. 1 6  PA is also
gaining ground in Central and South American legal systems, and
citations of Alexy in law journals are on the rise. In this section, we
focus on the cases of Canada, South Africa, and Israel, partly because
these systems have not historically been much influenced by German
or Continental law. In Canada, South Africa, and Israel, the
proportionality framework was unknown prior to the initiation of
rights review, and rights review was unknown until quite recently.
Once rights and review were established, the high courts of the
respective systems quickly adopted PA.
116. WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 287 (2005) ("The
Courts in Central and Eastern Europe have clearly followed the path of the proportionality
doctrine as developed by their Western counterparts, and in particular, by the European
Court of Human Rights."). Sadurski discusses the use of PA by the courts of Bulgaria,
Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Romania,




The Canadian Supreme Court adopted proportionality
analysis in the mid-1980s as the technique for deciding rights claims
under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Prior to the
Charter's enactment, in 1982, the constitution-the British North
American Act (1867)--contained only a handful of rights considered
to have constitutional status.1 17  In 1960, a statutory Bill of Rights
granted the Supreme Court the authority to construe statutes in light
of rights,' 1 8 but not the power to invalidate legislation, and the
Court's enforcement of the Bill of Rights was considered "meek" and
roundly criticized. 19 The Charter, by contrast, contains an extensive
catalog of rights and an invitation to courts to review statutes for
infringements of those rights. Under section 1, the Charter
"guarantees" rights "subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." 1
20
In the first cases arising under the Charter, Canada's Supreme
Court managed to avoid announcing a doctrinal formula for
determining permissible limits on Charter rights.12 1 In the Big Mart
(1985) case, the Court signaled in dicta that it would turn to "a form
of proportionality test" once a true conflict between a right and a
statute arose. 122  The Court laid out the terms of proportionality
117. These included rights of denominational schools and some language rights.
Constitution Act of 1867 §§ 93, 133.
118. CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS § 2: "Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly
declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the
Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe
or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms
herein recognized and declared." Led to a mode of deferential textual analysis under Section
2, the Supreme Court did not develop coherent standards of review under the Bill of Rights
regime. It struck down only one statute under the Bill of Rights, in R. v. Drybones, [1970]
S.C.R. 282 (Can.).
119. Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models
Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1963, 1970 (2004).
See also Andrew Lokan, Rise and Fall of Doctrine under Section 1 of the Charter, 24
OTTAWA L. REV. 163, 169 (1992).
120. CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 1 (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984 1 S.C.R. 357 (Can.)
(holding that the claimed right was not implicated by the challenged statute); R. v. Big M
Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.) (holding that that the challenged statute was
invalid because its purpose was impermissible).
122. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R.(Can.) at 352.
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analysis the next term, in Regina v. Oakes.123  At issue was a
provision of the Narcotics Act which created a rebuttable
presumption that a person found to be in possession of drugs was, in
fact, trafficking the drugs. Defendants who failed to provide
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption would be subject to the
penalties for trafficking. Mr. Oakes claimed that the provision
violated his right to the presumption of innocence under section 1 1 (d)
of the Charter.
Once the Court had concluded that the provision constituted a
prima facie violation of the right to the presumption of innocence, it
moved on to consider whether the Narcotics Act was nonetheless a
permissible limitation of the right under section 1. Chief Judge
Dickson, writing for the Court, broke the inquiry into two parts. The
threshold question was whether the statute was "of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or
freedom," meaning, "at a minimum, that an objective relate to
concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic
society." 124 If the statute satisfied this condition, its defenders bear
the burden of showing "that the means chosen [were] reasonable and
demonstrably justified." Citing the dicta in Big Mart, the Court
described this hurdle "as a form of proportionality test."'' 25 Noting
that "the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the
circumstances," Judge Dickson explained that "[t]here are, in my
view, three important components of a proportionality test":
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed
to achieve the objective in question. They must not be
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations.
In short, they must be rationally connected to the
objective. Second, the means, even if rationally
connected to the objective in this first sense, should
impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in
question. Third, there must be a proportionality
between the effects of the measures which are
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom,
and the objective which has been identified as of
123. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
124. Id. at 138-39.




Applying the analysis to the facts of the case, the court
concluded that the Narcotics Act provision failed to satisfy section 1.
Although "[t]he objective of protecting our society from the grave ills
associated with drug trafficking, is, in my view, one of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or
freedom in certain cases, ' 27 the statute did not survive the rational
connection test: "it would be irrational to infer that a person had an
intent to traffic on the basis of his or her possession of a very small
quantity of narcotics." 1
28
Why did the Supreme Court choose to read the limitation
clause as a proportionality requirement? "[R]easonable limits ... as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" could
be interpreted to mean "proportional limits," but that reading is not
compelled by the text. The language of section 1 seems equally open
to a more relaxed "reasonableness" or "rational basis" standard. But
the Court's choice for a more searching review of legislative
restrictions on rights might make sense in light of the Charter's
history. In 1980, after more than a decade of failed efforts to pass a
human rights instrument,129 Canada's new Liberal government made
a concerted push with a new Charter proposal in 1980.130 In an effort
to forestall opposition from the provinces, which had blocked
previous efforts in the 1970s, the proposed draft included a fairly
permissive limitation clause. The government's draft would
recognize rights "subject only to such reasonable limits as are
generally accepted in a free and democratic society with a
parliamentary system of government."' 3'
When the Parliament's Special Joint Committee on the
Constitution held hearings on the proposed draft, they encountered
strong opposition to this broad limitation clause from a wide range of
126. Id. (internal citation omitted).
127. Id. at 141.
128. Id. at 142.
129. Lorraine E. Weinrib, Of Diligence and Dice: Reconstituting Canada's
Constitution, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 207, 211-18 (1992).
130. Janet L. Hiebert, The Evolution of the Limitation Clause, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
103, 118-19 (1990).
131. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Revised Discussion Draft of Sept.
3, 1980, (Federal-Provincial Conference of First Ministers on the Constitution, Ottawa, Sept.
8-12, 1980), quoted in Hiebert, supra note 130, at 119 (1990) (emphasis added).
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witnesses. 132 In response to this criticism, the government revised
the clause. Out went the reference to "a parliamentary system of
government," with its overtones of parliamentary supremacy, and the
requirement that limits be only "generally accepted." In the new
draft, reasonable limits on rights must be "prescribed by law" and
capable of being "demonstrably justified" in a "free and democratic
society." The government could now "go to the provinces and
defend the new, more rigid, clause with claims that the public
supported a stronger Charter." The Charter was enacted with this
revision to section 1.133
Against this backdrop, most early commentators understood
the limitation clause to set a rather high hurdle for rights violations
even before the Court applied the clause in cases. A treatise from
1983 suggests that, in applying the limitation clause, courts "should
look to whether the impugned law is a fair, reasonable and
appropriate exercise of the power of the state or whether it is an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of
the individual to a fundamental freedom or a right as set out in the
Charter." 134  Walter Tarnopolsky, who had advocated more robust
rights protections for years, noted the affinity between the Charter
limitation language and limitation clauses in the ECHR. Tarnopolsky
suggested that, in interpreting the new Charter's limitation clause,
"resort might be made to the jurisprudence of the tribunals under the
European Convention... for guides to such reasonable limits."'
' 35
As discussed below, both the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights were then developing a
jurisprudence of proportionality around its limitation clauses.' 36
Thus, although it was hardly preordained that the Supreme Court
132. Janet Hiebert reports that the witnesses included "civil liberties groups, university
professors, women's groups, ethnic associations, legal groups, policemen, and crown
counsel," the "overwhelming majority" of whom were opposed to the limitation clause as
written. Hiebert, supra note 130, at 122.
133. Hiebert, supra note 130, at 125-26. The provinces did insist on an override clause,
to permit legislative overrides of Charter rulings, to counterbalance the more stringent
requirement. See Lorraine E. Weinrib, Canada's Constitutional Revolution: From
Legislative to Constitutional State, 33 ISR. L. REv. 13, 31 (1999).
134. MORRIS MANNING, RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, AND THE COURTS: A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 146 (1983).
135. Walter S. Tamopolsky, The Constitution and Human Rights, in AND No ONE
CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT 261, 269-70 (Keith
Banting & Richard Simeon eds. 1983).
136. See infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2.
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would treat the limitation clause as a proportionality requirement, this
interpretation does not appear to be inconsistent with the basic intent
to provide robust rights protection in the Charter.
Although Oakes is recognized as a landmark case, it
introduced the four-step proportionality analysis to Canadian law
with relatively little fanfare. The opinion stressed the continuity with
the pre-existing body of section 1 precedent, in particular, Big Mart,
which anticipated proportionality's use in this context. With respect
to the balancing phase of PA, which was not mentioned in Big Mart,
the Court devoted a paragraph to explaining why it was a necessary
element of the test: that even important laws that satisfy the first two
elements could still cause such harmful effects as to outweigh their
value.
What is striking is that the Oakes Court made no reference to
foreign antecedents of its proportionality analysis, and referenced no
other authority. The formula presented in Oakes is so close to the
German version of PA that we can presume the Court was familiar
with German doctrine. The Canadian Supreme Court does not avoid
citing foreign law on principle; indeed, discussions of foreign
analogues are quite common. Oakes itself contains a detailed
discussion of the presumption of innocence in the constitutional law
of the United States. The silence here suggests that, rather than
resting on a foreign pedigree, the court wishes to present
proportionality as a reasoned and sensible approach to the particular
problem posed by Charter rights. 137 Judge Dickson's strikingly non-
dogmatic statement that, in his view, proportionality has four
elements underlines that the court is developing the framework of
analysis through a process of reasoned argument.
In any case, it did not take long for the proportionality
framework developed in Oakes to be accepted as standard operating
procedure in Charter litigation. In 1987, justification of right-
limiting statutes under section 1 was identified straightforwardly with
a
[r]equirement of proportionality of means to ends
[that] normally has three aspects: a) there must be a
137. More recently, the Court has become more open about acknowledging the German
influence. See Attorney General of Canada v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610
(Can.).
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rational connection between the measures and the
objective they are to serve; b) the measures should
impair as little as possible the right or freedom in
question; and c) the deleterious effects of the measures
must be justifiable in light of the objective which they
are to serve.
3 8
And, in 1989, the court in Irvin Toys could declare that "[i]t is now
well established that the onus of justifying the limitation of a right or
freedom rests with the party seeking to uphold the limitation.., and
that the analysis to be conducted is that set forth by Dickson C.J. in
R. v. Oakes."'
139
Since that time, the Oakes proportionality framework has had
a pervasive impact on the rights review practice of Canada's
Supreme Court. Since the Irvin Toys decision, Oakes has been cited
in nearly two hundred decisions of the Court. 140 The Court found in
PA a formula that allowed it to inject itself into contentious rights
disputes, something the Court had never been willing to do under the
old Bill of Rights regime. 
141
But judicial decisions tell only part of the story of
proportionality's impact in Canada. As in Germany, the Court's
Charter jurisprudence has induced significant changes "upstream,"
requiring other government actors to consider proportionality as part
of the legislative process. Oakes and related decisions have had, as
Hiebert has shown, "an important influence on bureaucratic and
political cultures, which became more receptive, or at least more
resigned, to the importance of assessing proposed legislation from a
Charter perspective." 142 Knowing that their actions will be subject to
judicial review for conformity with the Charter, legislators have an
incentive to consider the proportionality of their policymaking, and to
build a record of their deliberations, in order to "Charter-proof' their
policies. 143
138. Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313,
para. 103 (Can.).
139. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (Can.).
140. As of January 13, 2009.
141. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
142. Hiebert, supra note 119, at 1970.
143. Janet L. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?, 69 MOD.
L. REV. 7, 27 (2006) [hereinafter Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights]; see also Janet L.
Hiebert, Legislating Under the Influence of Charter Norms 16 (forthcoming 2009)
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Considerations of proportionality enter into the earliest stages
of policy formation in Canada. Legislation proposed by the
government must be pre-screened for Charter conflicts before being
presented to the Cabinet, 144 and in the event that proposed legislation
would violate Charter rights in the view of the Justice Minister, the
Justice Minister is required by law to make a report to Parliament. 145
Such a report would doom proposed legislation, 146 and to avoid this
result, executive branch lawyers take an active role in crafting policy
to fit the dictates of proportionality. 147 While this executive branch
process takes place behind closed doors, Parliament also considers
whether proposed legislation is consistent with the Charter, and this
process is very public. When Charter challenges are anticipated,
Parliament works diligently to show that it has carefully chosen the
legislative means best suited to meeting an important government
objective. Hearing testimony, floor statements, and social science
data can all be added to bolster this point. 14  Parliament may also
send statutes into the world with preambles that stress how the
legislation is narrowly tailored to address an important objective. 149
Parliament is likely to make the most extensive record of
Charter issue deliberations when a serious challenge under the
Charter is anticipated-as when previous legislation on the same
subject was struck down. 150  To take just one example, in 1997 the
Supreme Court struck down bans on the advertising and promotion of
tobacco products as disproportionate violations of the freedom of
[hereinafter Hiebert, Legislating Under the Influence].
144. Hiebert, Legislating Under the Influence, supra note 143, at 13.
145. Hiebert, supra note 119, at 1971. Many provinces have adopted a similar pre-
review process. JAMES B. KELLY, GOVERNING WITH THE CHARTER: LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND FRAMERS' INTENT 214 (2005).
146. JANET L. HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS: WHAT IS PARLIAMENT'S ROLE? 12-13
(McGill-Queen's Press 2002).
147. KELLY, supra note 145.
148. HIEBERT, Legislating Under the Influence, supra note 143, at 10.
149. See Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, Charter
Dialogue Revisited-Or "Much Ado About Metaphors ", 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 48
(2007).
150. The "dialogue" between the Parliament and the Supreme Court that ensues after the
Court invalidates a statute has received sustained scholarly attention in Canada. See Hogg,
Bushell & Wright, supra note 149, at 1; Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter
Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a
Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997). At root, the subject of this
"dialogue" is proportionality.
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expression. 151 Working together, the departments of Health and
Justice drafted a new Tobacco Act with an eye to satisfying
constitutional concerns. The new restrictions were crafted to
follow the guidance offered in RJR-MacDonald: rather than a
comprehensive ban on advertising, the new approach focused on
"lifestyle" advertising. 153  When Parliament considered the new
legislation, it also took pains to demonstrate the proportionality of the
new law. The Senate's Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs, for instance, called a parade of legal experts
who testified as to the proportionality of the revised statute. 154
Nonetheless, in a 2007 case, the Supreme Court heard a
Charter challenge to the revised Tobacco Act and regulations. This
time, the Court concluded that the Act was consistent with the
Charter. 155 Parliament's careful efforts to demonstrate the statute's
proportionality paid off. As the Court noted, "[t]he government
presented detailed and copious evidence in support of its contention
that where the new legislation posed limits on free expression, those
limits were demonstrably justified under s[ection] 1 of the
Charter." 156
It is important to note here that Parliament, when faced with
judicial invalidation of a statute, could achieve its policy objectives
without taking the trouble to pass a new statute and make a case for
its proportionality. The Charter contains a "notwithstanding" clause
that permits Parliament (and the provincial governments) to pass
legislation in the face of judicial findings that the law violates
Charter rights. 157 But the Parliament has never availed itself of the
notwithstanding clause to override a judicial ruling. 158 Members of
151. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.).
152. HIEBERT, supra note 146, at 85.
153. Id.
154. Bill to Regulate the Manufacture, Sale, Labelling and Promotion of Tobacco
Products: Hearings on C-71 Before the Standard Senate Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs, Issue 54-Evidence-Afternoon Sitting (April 3, 1997), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/lega-e/54evb-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=35&ses=2&comm _id = 11.
155. Attorney General of Canada v. JTI-Macdonald Corp. [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, para. 8
(Can.).
156. Id.
157. CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 33. The "Notwithstanding
Clause" applies to most, but not all Charter rights, and the legislation can have effect for not
more than five years (subject to renewal).
158. Quebec, on the other hand, invoked the notwithstanding clause to maintain for
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Parliament and the government evidently regard it as too "politically
costly" to invoke the clause. 159 But this reluctance is itself a measure
of the Court's success at establishing the legitimacy of a
proportionality-based rights review in Canadian constitutional
culture. If the Court's use of PA analysis on Charter right claims
were regarded as judicial overreaching, politicians could override the
Court's rulings without incurring political costs.
Seeing how the government and Parliament have incorporated
proportionality standards into the legislative process puts the
Supreme Court's Charter jurisprudence in another light. Some
commentators have argued that the Supreme Court has become more
deferential to Parliament in reviewing legislation since the time of
Oakes.160  The charge raises fierce methodological issues but,
arguably, one could arrive at exactly the opposite conclusion. As the
other branches have taken on responsibility for considering
proportionality, and as they are socialized into what is a new system
of policymaking, the Court has had less of a need to conduct Charter
analysis de novo. Further, the Court has made clear that there is
rarely a single "right answer" to questions under section 1: what is
crucial to these politics is that the relevant decision-maker makes
clear how it has deliberated proportionality. As the Court has noted:
The tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and
the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator.
If the law falls within a range of reasonable
alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad
merely because they can conceive of an alternative
which might better tailor objective to infringement.
On the other hand, if the government fails to explain
several years a ban on non-French commercial signs in the face of a Supreme Court ruling
that such a policy violated equality and language rights. An Act to Amend the Charter of the
French Language, Statutes of Quebec, ch 54 [1988].
159. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights, supra note 143, at 19-20.
160. See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of
Proportionality Analysis Under the Canadian Charter's Section 1, 34 SuP. CT. L. REV. (2d)
501, 506-09 (2006); Lokan, supra note 119; Lorraine E. Weinrib, Canada's Charter of
Rights: Paradigm Lost?, 6 REV. CONST. STUD., 119 (2002). This view is far from universal.
Other commentators have lamented the Court's "judicial activism" under the Charter. See,
e.g., F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT PARTY
(2000); see also Christopher P. Manfredi, The Day the Dialogue Died: A Comment on
Sauv6 v. Canada, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 105, 116 (2007) (describing proportionality and
minimal impairment analyses as "strong forms of substantive review").
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why a significantly less intrusive and equally effective
measure was not chosen, the law may fail.
Thus, the Court looks to Parliament to demonstrate its own
conclusions about the proportionality of legislation.' 
62
Some critics of PA in Canada have also suggested that the
balancing step of PA has become irrelevant,1 63 and it is true that no
statutes determined to satisfy the earlier steps of the analysis have
been invalidated on grounds of "proportionality of effects," to use the
Canadian term. In 2007, however, the Supreme Court took pains to
repudiate these critics, confirming that it considered balancing in the
strict sense to be essential to rights review under the Charter:
Although cases are most often resolved on the issue of
minimal impairment, the final inquiry into
proportionality of effects is essential. It is the only
place where the attainment of the objective may be
weighed against the impact on the right. If rational
connection and minimal impairment were to be met,
161. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, para. 160
(Can.). See also JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, para. 43 (Can.).
Again, a certain measure of deference may be appropriate, where the problem
Parliament is tackling is a complex social problem. There may be many ways
to approach a particular problem, and no certainty as to which will be the most
effective. It may, in the calm of the courtroom, be possible to imagine a
solution that impairs the right at stake less than the solution Parliament has
adopted. But one must also ask whether the alternative would be reasonably
effective when weighed against the means chosen by Parliament. To
complicate matters, a particular legislative regime may have a number of goals,
and impairing a right minimally in the furtherance of one particular goal may
inhibit achieving another goal. Crafting legislative solutions to complex
problems is necessarily a complex task. It is a task that requires weighing and
balancing. For this reason, this Court has held that on complex social issues,
the minimal impairment requirement is met if Parliament has chosen one of
several reasonable alternatives.
Id.
162. The Court has also deferred to Parliament on the rational connection element of the
analysis. See JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R 610, para. 41.
Deference may be appropriate in assessing whether the requirement of rational
connection is made out. Effective answers to complex social problems, such as
tobacco consumption, may not be simple or evident. There may be room for
debate about what will work and what will not, and the outcome may not be
scientifically measurable. Parliament's decision as to what means to adopt
should be accorded considerable deference in such cases.
Id.




and the analysis were to end there, the result might be
to uphold a severe impairment on a right in the face of
a less important objective. 164
In the Commonwealth family of legal systems, the Canadian
Supreme Court has been an important agent in PA's diffusion. In
most Commonwealth systems, adopting proportionality means
abandoning less rigorous standards of judicial review derived from
traditional principles of equity and reasonableness. The Irish High
Court, which has exercised strong powers of rights review since
1937, embraced PA in only 1994, citing Oakes as authority. 165 By
1997, it could assert that proportionality was "a well-established tenet
of Irish Constitutional Law."' 166  In South Africa and the U.K.
(examined at length below), LRM now provides the standard, not
Wednesbury reasonableness (a cousin of rational basis, in American
parlance).
In New Zealand, where the main tenets of parliamentary
sovereignty have been retained, judges nonetheless adopted PA,
through the Oakes test. 167 The 1990 Bill of Rights Act (like the 1960
Canadian Act) ranks as ordinary legislation that expressly forbids
courts from striking down statutes for inconsistency with the listed
rights, 168 while directing courts to construe statutes to be consistent
with rights where possible.' 69  The limitation clause closely
resembles Canada's Charter language, laying down a
"reasonableness" standard.17 0  New Zealand's judges have yet to
agree on how these two clauses relate: should courts impose a saving
164. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, para. 46.
165. Heaney v. Ireland [1994] 3 IR 593 (Ir.).
166. Rock v. Ireland [1997] 3 IR 484, 500 (Ir.).
167. See Ministry of Transport v. Noort [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260 (C.A.) (citing Re Public
Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 373-74 (Can.), for the proportionality
test in Oakes). The program for the 2004 Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration
conference on proportionality, featuring papers and speeches by Australian and New
Zealand judges, gives one measure for the impact of proportionality in New Zealand. 22nd
AIJA Annual Conference, Proportionality--Cost-Effective Justice? (Sept. 17-19, 2004)
available at http://www.aija.org.au/ac04/papers.htm. See also The New Zealand Legal
Method Series, Rights and Freedoms in New Zealand: the Bill of Rights Comes of Age (July
27-28, 2007), available at http://www.law.auckland.ac.nz/ uoa/fms/default/law/news/docs/
Bill-of RightsConference.pdf.
168. Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109 § 4.
169. Id. § 6.
170. Id. § 5 ("Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.").
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construction first, and then inquire whether the statute so construed
unjustifiably limits rights; or should they first ask whether the law as
applied unjustifiably limits rights before searching for an alternative
construction?' 7 1  Yet from the start, the courts have read the
limitation clause to require Oakes-style PA rather than a Wednesbury
reasonableness standard or some other test.' 72 In recent years, New
Zealand's courts have carved out a significant role for themselves in
reviewing the proportionality of legislation, notwithstanding the
weakness of the Bill of Rights. In 2000, the Court of Appeals
suggested that courts may have a duty to declare statutes inconsistent
with the Bill of Rights, even though courts lack the power to
invalidate statutes. 173 In 2007, the Supreme Court (citing Oakes at
length) followed this lead, declaring that a reverse onus provision
disproportionately infringed the presumption of innocence, and that
no saving construction could be found. 174  This new assertiveness
may comprise an important turning point for the judiciary. The
courts now seem willing to use PA as the means of supervising
legislative activity and protecting rights.' 
75
In Australia, which does not possess a written charter of
rights of any kind, senior judges now intensively debate the merits of
proportionality. 76
2. South Africa
The mid-1990s were years of rapid constitutional
development for South Africa, and the constitutionalization of
proportionality was among the major outcomes. As part of the
transition from the apartheid regime, an Interim Constitution was
ratified in November 1993. Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution
contained an extensive catalog of fundamental rights, along with a
171. See Hansen v. The Queen [2007] 3 N.Z.L.R. I (S.C.); Noort, 3 N.Z.L.R. at 260.
172. See Noort, 3 N.Z.L.R. at 283. See PHILIP A. JOSEPH, The New Zealand Bill of
Rights Experience, in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 283, 305 (Philip Alston ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999)
(discussing Noort's affirmation of the Oakes test).
173. Moonen v. Film and Literature Bd. of Review [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 9, 17 (C.A).
174. Hansen, [2007] 3 N.Z.L.R. 1.
175. See Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights, supra note 143, at 14-15.
176. Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of Australia, Address at the Australian Bar




limitation clause-section 33-reminiscent of Canada's. 77  The
interim constitution also established South Africa's Constitutional
Court and vested it expressly with the power of judicial review. 1 78
The new Constitutional Court initially resisted applying PA to
the limitation clause, but this resistance evaporated almost
immediately. In State v. Zuma and Two Others, its first decision on
the issue, the Court confronted a fact pattern similar to that of Oakes:
a constitutional challenge to a "reverse onus" provision that placed
on criminal defendants the burden of showing police confessions to
be involuntary. 179  The Court found a prima facie violation of the
constitutional presumption of innocence, but declined to deploy PA
to determine the provision's constitutionality. While acknowledging
that the proportionality "criteria may well be of assistance to our
courts in cases where a delicate balancing of individual rights against
social interests is required," the Court insisted that "section 33(1)
itself sets out the criteria which we are to apply, and [we] see no
reason, in this case at least, to attempt to fit our analysis into the
Canadian pattern."
80
The Court overcame its resistance to PA in its very next
decision on the limitation clause. Significantly, the justices of the
newly-constituted Court spent a week in Germany visiting with the
judges of the GFCC shortly before issuing the ruling. 8' State v.
Makwanyane182 presented a challenge to the constitutionality of the
death penalty. Writing the lead opinion, President Chaskalson found
that the statute represented a prima facie violation of the
constitutional right against cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishments. 183 He then turned to proportionality: "The limitation
177. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993. Section 33 provided that fundamental rights may
be limited by law of general application, so long as the limitation is reasonable, "justifiable
in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality," and does not "negate the
essential content of the right in question." The constitution further provided that limitations
on a subset of fundamental rights-including the rights to human dignity, freedom from
forced labor, and freedom of conscience-were permissible only when such limitations were
"necessary." § 33(1).
178. Id. § 98(5).
179. SvZuma & Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) (S. Afr.).
180. Id. at 660.
181. Craig Smith, An American's View of The Federal Constitutional Court:
Karlsruhe's Justices, 2 GERMAN L.J., available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.
php?id= 17.
182. SvMakwanyane &Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at436 (S. Afr.).
183. Id. at 434.
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of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary
in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing
values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality."' 8 4
Proportionality, in the court's view, is "implicit in the provisions of
section 33(1)":
The fact that different rights have different
implications for democracy, and in the case of our
Constitution, for 'an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality', means that there is no
absolute standard which can be laid down for
determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles
can be established, but the application of those
principles to particular circumstances can only be
done on a case-by-case basis. This is inherent in the
requirement of proportionality, which calls for the
balancing of different interests. 185
The Court then laid out a laundry list of factors that bear on PA:
In the balancing process, the relevant considerations
will include the nature of the right that is limited, and
its importance to an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which
the right is limited and the importance of that purpose
to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its
efficacy and, particularly where the limitation has to
be necessary, whether the desired ends could
reasonably be achieved through other means less
damaging to the right in question. 
86
Chaskaslon explicitly referenced foreign sources of authority
for the move, discussing the role of PA in German, Canadian, and
European law, noting differences and similarities with the South
Africa context.187 He then turned to consider the death penalty's
proportionality. The putative objects of the statute-deterrence,
prevention and retribution-were weighed against "the factors, which
taken together, make capital punishment cruel, inhuman and
degrading: the destruction of life, the annihilation of dignity, the






elements of arbitrariness, inequality and the possibility of error in the
enforcement of the penalty."'' 88 Although the Makwanyane formula
treats proportionality as a single-stage, multi-factored balancing,
elements of a suitability and a least-restrictive means inquiry are
present. In the end, the death penalty came up short, as there was
little evidence that the death penalty was a more effective deterrent
than the less infringing alternative of life imprisonment, and
retribution had little value in the post-apartheid constitutional order,
which was expressly dedicated to reconciliation.'
1 89
Makwanyane's approach was adopted in subsequent cases.
Initially, proportionality was treated more as a pragmatic approach to
applying the limitation clause than as an ineluctable principle of
law. 190 When South Africa adopted a permanent constitution in
1996, however, PA was elevated to the status of a constitutional
principle. The Interim Constitution's limitation clause was revised to
incorporate the factors named in Makwanyane as elements of PA. 91
Crucially, the Constitutional Court certified that the new Constitution
was consistent with the interim document's Constitutional
Principles. 192 The Court considered, and rejected, objections to the
effect that section 36(1) did not comply with international norms on
human rights, and hence, with the rights guarantees in the Interim
Constitution, because it did not include a "necessity" requirement on
188. Id. at 448.
189. Id.at446,451.
190. See, e.g., S v Williams & Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at 649 (S. Afr.) ("In S v
Makwanyane this Court dealt with s 11(2) of the Constitution on the basis that s 33(1) is
applicable to breaches of that section. I follow the same approach in the present case."
(citation omitted)).
191. The limitation clause reads:
36. Limitation of rights
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including -
1. the nature of the right;
2. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
3. the nature and extent of the limitation;
4. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
5. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
2. Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution,
no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
192. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744
(CC). The Constitutional Court was given responsibility for certification by section 71(2) of
the Interim Constitution.
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rights limitations. 193  The Court held section 36(1) to be valid,
essentially because PA defines best practice standards for necessity
review:
It is true that international human rights instruments
indicate that limitations on fundamental rights are
permissible only when they are "necessary" or
''necessary in a democratic society." But "necessity"
is by no means universally accepted as the appropriate
norm for limitation in national constitutions. The term
has, moreover, been given various interpretations, all
of which give central place to the proportionate
relationship between the right to be protected and the
importance of the objective to be achieved by the
limitation. The content this Court gave to the
limitations clause in IC [Interim Constitution] 33(1) in
S v Makwanyane and Another conformed to that
interpretation. Indeed, NT [New Text] 36(1) is
substantially a repetition of what was said in that
judgment. But what matters for present purposes is
that the conceptual requirement established by
international norms relative to proportionality or
balancing be met. The choice of language lay with the
CA [Constitutional Assembly]. The criteria set out in
NT 36(1) do in fact conform to internationally
accepted standards, and comply with CP
[Constitutional Principle] 11.194
193. S v Williams & Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at 804 (S. Aft.).
194. Id. at 804-05. It should be noted that proportionality gained other footholds in
South African law in addition to section 36(1) during this period, although these
developments are less relevant to our purposes. Section 33(1) of the Final Constitution
created a "right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair."
This provision, and legislation passed pursuant to it, has been described as imposing a form
of proportionality test. See Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000 § 6(f);
Carephone (Pty) Ltd v No & Others 1999 (3) SA 304 (LC) (S. Afr.); CLAUDIA LANGE,
UNREASONABLENESS AS A GROUND OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SOUTH AFRICA: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2002); Cora Hoexter, Standards
of Review of Administrative Action: Review for Reasonableness, in A DELICATE BALANCE:
THE PLACE OF A JUDICIARY IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 61, 64-65 (2006).
In addition, South Africa's Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, signed into
law in 1995, created a committee competent to grant amnesty for "any act, omission or
offence on the grounds that it is an act associated with a political objective." Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995 § 18(1). In determining whether a
given deed is "associated with a political objective" within the meaning of the statute, it lists
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Since the mid-1990s, proportionality has become a
cornerstone of the work of South Africa's Constitutional Court.
Writing in 2003, Justice Albie Sachs declared that "[p]roportionality
and balancing are at the heart of constitutional litigation in our
country," and estimated that as many as three quarters of the Court's
cases require the justices to engage in a balancing analysis.1 95 Under
section 36(1)'s proportionality framework, the Court has resolved a
number of high profile disputes, including constitutional challenges
to the corporal punishment of juveniles,' 96 anti-sodomy statutes, 197
felon disenfranchisement,198 a prohibition on cannabis as applied to
Rastafarians, who use it for religious purposes,1 99 and a number of
criminal procedure rules alleged to burden the presumption of
innocence.200
In its development since the mid-1990s, "South African
limitations jurisprudence has borrowed extensively from Canadian
limitations jurisprudence.",20 1 However, PA does not take the exact
same form in the two jurisdictions: in particular, the analysis in
South Africa is not always conducted in a sequence of discrete
steps. 202  But even if "as part of its overall, nonmechanical
a number of factors to be considered, including "the relationship between the act, omission
or offence and the political objective pursued, and in particular the directness and proximity
of the relationship and the proportionality of the act, omission or offence to the objective
pursued." Id. at § 20(3)(f) (emphasis added). Although the Amnesty Committee did not
apply any sort of structured proportionality analysis, it did sometimes rely on a rough least
restrictive means test to determine whether amnesty was appropriate. See, e.g., Cornelius
Johannes Van Wyk, Amnesty Decision No. 1050/96 (Dec. 6, 1996).
195. Albie L. Sachs, The Challenges of Post-Apartheid South Africa, 7 GREEN BAG 2d
63, 67 (2003).
196. S v Williams & Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) (S. Afr.).
197. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & Another v Minister of Justice 1999
(1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.).
198. Minister of Home Affairs v Nat 'l Inst. for Crime Prevention & the Re-integration of
Offenders (NICRO) & Others 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) (S. Afr,).
199. Prince v The President of the Law Soc'y of the Cape of Good Hope 2001 (2) SA
388 (CC) (S. Afr.).
200. See, e.g., S v Mello & Another 1998 (3) SA 712 (CC) (S. Aft.). For a discussion of
the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence under the limitations clause, see ZIYAD MOTALA &
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ANALYSIS AND CASES 414-32 (2002).
201. Kevin Iles, A Fresh Look at Limitations: Unpacking Section 36, 23 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 68, 69 (2007).
202. In the words of Justice Ngcobo:
None of these factors [in § 36(1)] is individually decisive. Nor are they
exhaustive of the relevant factors to be considered. These factors together with
other relevant factors are to be considered in the overall enquiry. The
limitation analysis thus involves the weighing up of competing values and
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assessment, the [Court] does not always disaggregate the various
strands of the test," as in Canada, "[tihe least restrictive means part of
the test has been perhaps the most important in practice. ... 20
Like its Canadian and German counterparts, the South
African Constitutional Court also recognizes that the LRM test
permits deference to legislative judgments. As an academic authority
has noted, "[t]he use of a value-based, context-sensitive standard to
determine the reasonableness of legislative and other limitations of
fundamental rights, which is based on proportionality and balancing,
is hardly consistent with the idea of a rigid separation between the
legislative and judicial functions. '2 °4 For its part, the Court expects
the parliament to consider the constitutional issues as part of its
policymaking process. In S. v. Manamela (2000), Justices O'Regan
and Cameron noted that:
[T]he problem for the Court is to give meaning and
effect to the factor of less restrictive means without
unduly narrowing the range of policy choices
available to the Legislature in a specific area. The
Legislature when it chooses a particular provision
does so not only with regard to constitutional rights,
but also in the light of concerns relating to cost,
practical implementation, the prioritization of certain
social demands and needs and the need to reconcile
conflicting interests. The Constitution entrusts the
task of legislation to the Legislature because it is the
appropriate institution to make these difficult policy
choices. When a court seeks to attribute weight to the
factor of "less restrictive means" it should take care to
avoid a result that annihilates the range of choice
available to the Legislature. In particular, it should
take care not to dictate to the Legislature unless it is
satisfied that the mechanism chosen by the Legislature
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality.
Prince v The President of the Law Socy of the Cape of Good Hope 2001 (2) SA 388 (CC)
(S. Afr.) (internal citation omitted).
203. Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REv. 789, 842
(2007).
204. Henk Botha, Rights, Limitations, and the (Im)possibility of Self-Government, in
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 13, 14 n.5 (Henk Botha,
Andre Van der Walt & Johan Van der Walt eds., 2003).
[47:72
PROPORTIONALITY BALANCING
is incompatible with the Constitution. 20 5
In contrast to Canada, executive-branch domination of
lawmaking in South Africa makes it difficult to assess the upstream
impact of the Court's proportionality jurisprudence on the legislative
process. Especially following 1998 reforms that strengthened
presidential institutions, 20 6 legislative proposals in South Africa are
thoroughly vetted by a battery of presidential and cabinet teams
before they receive a public airing in the National Assembly.2" This
vetting includes consultation with state law advisers, who certify that
bills are consistent with the Constitution and existing law.20 It is
these early stages of the legislative process, which take place out of
the public eye, that offer officials the best opportunity to consider
whether statutes that restrict fundamental rights meet the
requirements of proportionality. This is because the National
Assembly's influence over policy is "tangential at best,, 20 9 owing to
the limited budgetary and staffing resources available to legislators,
the large number of legislators, and displacement of parliamentary
oversight by executive branch bodies. 210  In this different
institutional context, it may be that we will not see the legislature
build a record of its own analysis of the proportionality of proposed
legislation.
3. Israel
Israel is one of the four countries in the world today without a
codified, entrenched constitution. 2 11  The country nonetheless
possesses a Supreme Court that became a powerful court when it
began, in the 1980s, to inject rights and doctrines of judicial review
205. S v Manamela & Others 2000 (3) SA 1, 41 (CC) (S. Aft.) (O'Regan, J., and
Cameron, AJ, dissenting). The majority in this case declared its agreement with these
principles. Id. at 20.
206. PHIROSHAW CAMAY & ANNE J. GORDON, EVOLVING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN
SOUTH AFRICA 316-17 (2004).
207. In addition to the National Assembly, South Africa's bicameral parliament includes
a National Council of Provinces that represents the country's nine provinces and has a still
more limited role in policy formation than the National Assembly.
208. DEWALD VAN NIEKERK ET AL., GOVERNANCE, POLITICS, AND POLICY IN SOUTH
AFRICA 88-89 (2001); see also Arthur Chaskalson, Dialogue: Equality and Dignity in South
Africa, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 189 (2002); Republic of South Africa, Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development, The Legislative Process, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/
2004dojsite/legislation/legprocess.htm.
209. ANTHONY BUTLER, CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA 95 (2004).
210. Id. at 95-96; CAMAY & GORDON, supra note 206, at 337.
211. The others are Bhutan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
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into the higher law.2 12 In this same period, the Court was in the
throes of developing a kind of indigenous, proto-proportionality
doctrine. Once the use of PA in other legal systems came to its
attention in the 1990s, the Court quickly adopted the standard,
German-based framework. It then used PA both for determining
when limitations on rights were permissible, and for judging the
legality of administrative action. Today, arguably, the Israeli
Supreme Court applies PA more consistently and rigorously than any
other judicial body in the world.
Israel's most important "proto-proportionality" cases share a
similar fact pattern. Regulation 119 of the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations, a holdover from the days of the British Mandate, 21 3
gives military commanders wide latitude in taking measures
responsive to terrorist acts. In cases challenging these responses as
"excessive," the Supreme Court adopted a simplified form of
proportionality analysis. Hamri v. Commander of Judea and
Samaria (1982) 214 concerned Mahmoud and Rathab, two West Bank
men, who confessed to stabbing a night-watchman to death on a
mission ordered by the Fatah organization. 215 The Israeli military
commanders ordered their house demolished as a deterrent to future
would-be terrorists .21 6 The petitioner in the case, Mahmoud's father
and Rathab's uncle, asked the court for an order nisi against the
commander of Judea and Samaria to show why he should not refrain
from demolishing the house. 2 17 Writing for the Court, then-Justice
Aharon Barak held that the order to destroy the house was reasonable
given the very serious acts of murder committed by the two young
men. 2  Although he did not use the word "proportionality," the
essence of his argument was that administrative measures had to bear
a proportionate relationship to the prohibited acts that triggered them.
The fact pattern in Turkeman v. Minister of Defense2 19 was similar: a
212. Aeyal M. Gross, The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law, 3.2 ISR. STUD.
80, 85 (1998); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through
Constitutionalization: Lessons from Israel's Constitutional Revolution, 33 COMP. POL. 315
(2001).
213. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 P.G. no. 1442, Supp. No. 2, p. 1089.
214. HCJ 361/82 Hamdi v. Commander of Judea and Samaria [1982] IsrSC 36(3) 439.
215. Id. at 440, translated in I PALESTINE Y.B. INTL'L. L. 129, 130 (1984).
216. Id. at 443-44, translated in I PALESTINE Y.B. INTL'L. L. 129, 133 (1984).
217. Id. at 439, translated in I PALESTINEY.B. INTL'L. L. 129, 129 (1984).
218. Id. at 444, translated in I PALESTINE Y.B. INTL'L. L. 129, 133 (1984).
219. HCJ 5510/92 Turkeman v. Minister of Defense [1993] IsrSC 48(1) 217.
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West Bank man shot two Israelis, killing one and wounding the
other, and the military commander ordered the demolition of his
domicile. Here, however, the house belonged to the offender's
mother, and she shared it with her seven sons, the oldest of whom
was married and had his own family. 220 The military had ordered the
whole house razed after having decided that it was impossible to
demolish only part of the house. Justice Barak, writing for the Court,
found the measure unreasonable. "Every authority, no matter how
extensive, has to be exercised in a reasonable way," he wrote,
insisting that the commander must choose a response that
corresponds to the gravity of the offense. 22 1 This time, the Court
overturned the demolition order as "disproportionate," and
substituted an order sealing off two rooms of the house, so that the
married son could continue to live there. 222 Although the Court did
invoke the principle of proportionality in Turkamen, there was no
reference yet to the doctrine in other jurisdictions.
Scholarly commentary paved the way for the judicial
acceptance of PA. A 1994 comparative piece by law professor (and
later, Supreme Court Justice) Itzhak Zamir was the first important
piece to focus on the connections between proportionality in German
and Israeli administrative law. 223  Concurrently, Aharon Barak's
1994 commentary on Israel's new Basic Law of Human Dignity and
Freedom explicitly advocated the Oakes proportionality analysis as
the method for determining when rights must yield to public law.
22 4
In their capacity as justices on the Supreme Court, the authors
of these pieces quickly and forcefully brought this cosmopolitan
perspective on proportionality into the law of Israel. Justice Zamir
surveyed other jurisdictions' acceptance of proportionality and made
a strong pitch for giving it the "proper status and weight" in Israel's
220. Id. at 218-19.
221. Fania Domb, Judicial Decisions: Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel
Relating to the Administered Territories, 25 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS 323, 348 (1995)
(summarizing Turkeman).
222. Turkeman, [1993] IsrSC 48(1) at 220.
223. Itzhak Zamir, Israeli Administrative Law Compared to German Administrative
Law, 2 MISHPAT U'MIMSHAL [Law and Government in Israel] 109, 130 (1994). A 1990
piece by Professor Segal was also influential, although it lacked the extensive engagement
with international materials. Zeev Segal, Disproportionality in Administrative Law, 39
HAPRAKLIT 501 (1990).
224. 3 AIARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN THE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1994).
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law, in Euronet Golden Lines [1992] Ltd. v. Minister of
Communication. 225 For his part, as Chief Justice, Barak offered an
extensive discussion of the origins and diffusion of proportionality
analysis in his Ben-Atiyah v. Minister of Education, Culture & Sports
concurrence. 226 Barak even found antecedents of proportionality in
Maimonides's injunction to treat illness with powerful medicines
only if weaker medicines fail. 227  Ben-Atiyah involved a program
which allowed students the opportunity not to take the matriculation
examination in a certain subject.228  However, the Ministry of
Education denied access to this program to students enrolled in
schools that, in past years, had high instances of cheating on the
matriculation examinations. 229  Barak would have overturned the
ministry's order on proportionality grounds, while the other two
judges decided the case in terms of reasonableness, a lower standard
than LRM in Israeli law. 230
The decisive turning point for proportionality came in United
Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 2 31 a landmark in
Israeli constitutional law. In that case, creditors had challenged a
statute that permitted a special governmental body to cancel debts on
the grounds that it violated the right to property guaranteed in Israel's
Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty. 232 The first question for
the Court was the question of judicial review: whether the Court
possessed the power to strike down legislation that contravened
rights named in the Basic Laws.233 The Court answered in the
affirmative. 234  Although the Basic Laws were passed through the
procedure for ordinary legislation by Israel's parliament, the Knesset,
the Court held that the catalog of fundamental rights had
225. HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Commc'n [1994]
lsrSC 48(5) 412,435.
226. HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Educ., Culture & Sports [1995] IsrSC 49(5)
1, 9. Ben-Atiyah was actually published after United Mizrachi Bank, but it was argued
several months before United Mizraehi Bank.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 5. The matriculation examination is a national test required in order to
graduate from High School (similar to the Regents diploma in New York).
229. Id. at 6.
230. Id. at 15-16.
231. CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank plc v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] IsrSC
49(4) 221.
232. Id. at 223-34.
233. See Omi, Leading Decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel and Extracts of the




constitutional stature.235 Therefore, the Knesset could pass statutes
that infringed on those rights only if they satisfied section 8 of the
Basic Law: the limitation clause.236 This read: "There shall be no
violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the
values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an
extent no greater than is required.,
237
Writing for himself and six other members of the Court, Chief
Justice Barak held that the debt-cancelling statute did create a prima
facie violation of the property right, and then turned to consider
whether the statute nonetheless satisfied the limitations clause. 238 In
interpreting the limitation clause, Chief Justice Barak took the final
element-"to an extent that does not exceed what is necessary"-to
be a constitutional requirement of proportionality. 239 Barak went on
to note that a form of proportionality is recognized in Israeli
administrative law, and used comparative examples to show that the
move of proportionality from administrative law to the constitutional
level has ample precedent in other legal systems. 24  He explained
that proportionality began in administrative law in Europe, "and from
there spread to the constitutional law of most countries in Europe and
outside of it." 241  Barak quoted Oakes on the elements of the
proportionality test and cited to German authorities.242 He concluded
that the statute met the conditions of the limitation clause.
243
After it was introduced in United Mizrachi Bank, the four-
stage proportionality analysis was embraced by Israel's Supreme
Court, and its application has not been confined to adjudicating rights
claims under the Basic Laws. The Oakes-style proportionality test
235. Id. at 766-67.
236. Id. at 768.
237. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, S.H. 1391 (Isr.). The
limitations clause was amended in 1994 to permit explicit legislative override of Basic Law
provisions. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty-Amendment, 5754-1994, S.H. 1454
(Isr.), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
238. See Omi, supra note 233, at 769.
239. Id. at 789. Barak's opinion was not the only one to mention proportionality;
President Shamgar also mentioned proportionality as an element of the limitation clause.
See United Mizrachi Bank [1995] IsrSC 49(4) at 335-52. But because Justice Barak's
discussion was more extensive and because he wrote for a majority of the Justices, while
President Shamgar wrote only for himself, we focus on Barak's analysis.
240. See United Mizrachi Bank, [1995] IsrSC 49(4) at 436.
241. Id. Barak specifically mentions Canada and South Africa.
242. Id. at 436-37.
243. Id. at 446.
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was also applied as a check on administrative actions.2 44 The 2004
Beit Sourik case demonstrated how much bite PA has attained in
Israel's law. The case raised a challenge to plans for the
controversial separation fence intended to impede terrorist access to
245Israel. 4 The proposed route for the fence would separate thousands
of West Bank farmers from their fields and would require the seizure
of many local inhabitants' lands. The petitioners claimed violations
of Israeli administrative law and international law.246
Writing for a unanimous three-justice panel, Barak found that
247the route violated proportionality in the strict sense. Justice Barak
ruled that the plans satisfied the suitability and LRM sub-tests: the
fence was rationally connected to the goal of security, and no
alternative route that infringed on human rights less could provide the
same level of security. 24 8  But the gains in security that followed
from the choice of the challenged route as opposed to a less intrusive
alternative simply were not sufficiently high to justify the
infringement:
The difference between the security benefits required
by the military commander's approach and the
security benefits of the alternate route is very small in
comparison to the large difference between a fence
that separates the local inhabitants from their lands
and a fence that does not create such a separation or
that creates a separation which is small and can be
tolerated.249
The Beit Sourik decision placed an unprecedented amount of
weight on PA. The outcome in this high profile case turned entirely
on the balancing test. Thus, the Court conceded that striking down
the proposed route will reduce Israel's security, and still the Court
250
struck it down. Moreover, the Court had not even found a prima
244. See, e.g., HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Def. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94 (upholding
right to equality in the context of military service); HCJ 3278/02 Ctr. for the Def. of the
Individual v. Commander of the IDF [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 385 (judicial review of
administrative detention by army).
245. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC
58(5) 807, translated in ISR. L. REP. 264 (2004).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 861, translated in ISR. L. REP. 264, 332 (2004).
248. Id. at 849-50, translated in ISR. L. REP. 264, 308-09 (2004).
249. Id. para. 61.
250. Id. at 861-62, translated in ISR. L. REP. 264, 323 (2004).
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facie violation of a constitutional right to justify this move. 25 1 In Beit
Sourik, proportionality figured as a general principle of
administrative law, not as a means to determine when limitations on
basic rights are constitutionally permissible. Perhaps because PA
was made to do so much work in this decision, Chief Justice Barak
justified proportionality at some length in his opinion. He described
proportionality as a "basic principle" of law that "transverses all
branches of the law." 252 It is part of the "universal" solution to the
"general problem in (international and national) law" of "balancing
security and liberty., 253  Barak then went on to demonstrate
proportionality's doctrinal roots as "a general principFle of
international law" as well as Israeli administrative law. 25  The
decision also stressed how similar the PA framework is across
diverse legal systems, including international law, common law, civil
law, and Israeli law.
255
The judiciary is not the only branch of government to be
affected by the constitutionalization of proportionality in Israel.
According to Chief Justice Barak, "the executive branch has
internalized the constitutional revolution., 256  All government
legislation and administrative actions "are carefully evaluated to
determine if they pass constitutional muster," and the Attorney
General and departmental legal advisers have inculcated the civil
service in the framework of rights analysis.257 Chief Justice Barak
also wrote that "the legislative branch takes the constitutional change
seriously," and "exercises great caution on this issue., 258 However,
unlike in Canada, Israel's Supreme Court continues to conduct its
proportionality analysis de novo, without regard to the judgments of
other branches regarding the constitutionality of their actions. 259
251. The court finds these rights within article 46 of the Hague Regulations and article
27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Id. at 832-36, translated in ISR. L. REP. 264, 289-93
(2004).
252. Id. at 836-37, translated in ISR. L. REP. 264, 293 (2004).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 837-48, translated in ISR. L. REP. 264, 294-95 (2004).
255. Id. at 839-40, translated in ISR. L. REP. 264, 296-97 (2004).
256. Aharon Barak, Human Rights in Israel, 39 ISR. L. REv. 12, 19 (2006).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. The Court forcefully defended its prerogative to make an independent
proportionality ruling in the Beit Sourik case:
The second question examines the proportionality of the route of the separation
fence, as determined by the military commander. This question raises no
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B. International Regimes
We now turn to the consolidation of PA in three regimes
created by international law: the European Convention on Human
Rights, the European Community, and the World Trade
Organization. Through their courts, these regimes have evolved
important constitutional features, leading scholars to engage in lively
debates about whether they have been "constitutionalized" in some
meaningful way.260 Regardless of how we respond to this issue,261
these debates are data. They alert us to the fact that something
transformative has happened to which traditional concepts and
categories, drawn from comparative or international law and politics,
may not easily apply. 262
In each of the cases, PA is directly implicated in the processes
and outcomes on which scholars typically focus when they argue
about constitutionalization. The finding should not surprise. In each
regime, a trustee court has been delegated the task of enforcing
treaties, and these instruments possess, or have evolved to manifest, a
now familiar structure. Core treaty values, such as a right of an
individual or a state, are qualified by other important values,
qualifications expressed in the form of derogations that states may
claim in the public interest. In our view, a court that adjudicates
conflicts arising from such a structure is a court operating in a
constitutional mode, inherently, irrespective of how one understands
the "constitutional" nature of the regime more broadly. The fact that
the high courts of these regimes have embraced PA, a global
constitutional standard, supports the point.
problems in the military field; rather, it relates to the severity of the injury
caused to the local inhabitants by the route decided upon by the military
commander... The standard for this question is not the subjective standard of
the military commander. The question is not whether the military commander
believed, in good faith, that the injury is proportionate. The standard is
objective. The question is whether, by legal standards, the route of the
separation fence passes the tests of proportionality. This is a legal question, the
expertise for which is held by the Court."
IsrSC 58(5) 807, para. 48.
260. See supra notes 2-4.
261. See Alec Stone Sweet, What is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in
International Relations Theory, 55 REV. POL. 441 (1994).
262. Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU




1. The European Community
The Treaty of Rome, which entered into force in 1959,
constituted the European Community (EC), the first pillar of the
European Union. 263  Most important, the Treaty laid down a
blueprint for building a "single" or "common" market. Market-
building was to proceed through two linked processes. "Negative
integration" refers to the process through which barriers to cross-
border economic activity within Europe would be removed; and
"positive integration" refers to the process through which the EC's
legislative organs would produce "harmonized," "supranational"
market regulations, to replace the kaleidoscope of national measures.
In 1970, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) took a first step
toward recognizing proportionality as an unwritten, general principle
of EC law.2 4 It derived a necessity requirement (LRM) from a ban
on discrimination, without citing source or authority. Today
proportionality governs lawmaking and adjudication in virtually all
important domains of law established by the Treaty of Rome.
Indeed, the consensus among doctrinal authorities is that
proportionality is inherent to any proper legal system, and therefore
to the EU, being "an expression of the principle of rule of law."
265
PA constitutes the foundation of the ECJ's jurisprudence on
263. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
264. We believe that the first instance in which the ECJ applied a LRM test was in the
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, where it stated: "A public authority may not
impose obligations on a citizen except to the extent to which they are strictly necessary in
the public interest to attain the purpose of the measure." T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 152 (5th ed. 2003) (citing Advocate General Dutheillet de
Lamothe in Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle
ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1146). In that case, the Advocate General
derived it from former Article 40 (now Article 34) of the Treaty, the pertinent part of which
states: "The common organization [for administering the Common Agricultural Policy]
shall be limited to pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 33 and shall exclude any
discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community." Jiirgen Schwarze,
The Role of General Principles of Administrative Law in the Process of Europeanization of
National Law, in STUDIES ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 24, 37 (Luis Ortega Alvarez ed.,
2005). In any event, in Schraeder, the Court announced that "the principle of
proportionality is one of the general principles of Community law. By virtue of that
principle, measures... are lawful provided that [they] are appropriate and necessary for
meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question. Of course, when
there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measure must be
used .. " Case 265/87, Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau, 1989 E.C.R. 2237, 2269.
265. Schwarze, supra note 264, at 37.
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the four freedoms-free movement of goods, labor, capital, services
(and establishment)-and of the Court's approach to indirect sex
discrimination.266 It is at the heart of the Community's largely
judge-made system of administrative law, and applies to mergers and
anti-trust law. PA also dominates the ECJ's approach to the
fundamental rights, which the Court incorporated into the Treaty of
Rome, during the 1969-74 period, as "general principles of law."
267
The Member States have ratified these moves in various ways,
helping to institutionalize proportionality as an overarching,
constitutional principle. The ill-fated 2004 European Constitution
contained an elaborate, 54-article, Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union. Following the ECJ's lead, Article 52 states:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and
freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided
for by law and respect the essence of those rights and
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality,
limitations may be made only if they are necessary
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognized by the Union or the need to protect the
rights and freedoms of others.
The Charter, including Article 52, was part of the package of reforms
agreed to by Member States in December 2007 (the Lisbon Treaty),
now in the process of being ratified.268
After the consolidation of the ECJ's "constitutional" doctrines
of supremacy and direct effect, 269 the emergence of proportionality
266. STONE SWEET, supra note 2, at 165-70; see generally Giacinto della Cananea,
Beyond the State: The Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative
Law, in STUDIES ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW, supra note 264, at 68.
267. Case 4/73, Nold v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507. The Treaty of Rome contains
no unified catalogue of rights and instead establishes them in various articles of Titles I and
III. See supra note 263. The Court cited the "constitutional traditions common to the
Member States" and the European Convention on Human Rights as sources. Id.; see also
Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. Societe Beige des Auteurs, Compositeurs et
Editeurs, [1974] 2 COMMON MKT. L. R. 238, 246-47; Joseph H.H. Weiler & Nicolas J.S.
Lockhart, "Taking Rights Seriously" Seriously: The European Court and its Fundamental
Rights Jurisprudence-Part 1, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 51, 84-94 (1995).
268. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, 8, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 13,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtmi.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML.
269. The doctrine of supremacy, first announced in Costa, iays down the rule that, in
any conflict between an EC legal rule and a rule of national law, the former must be given
primacy. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L, 1964 E.C.R. 1141, 1159-60. Indeed, according to
the Court, every EC norm, from the moment of entry into force, "renders automatically
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balancing as a master technique of judicial governance is the most
important institutional innovation in the history of European legal
integration. We will briefly illustrate the point here with reference to
the major outcomes produced by the Court in the free movement of
goods domain, focusing on Article 28 of the Treaty of Rome, which
prohibits non-tariff barriers to trade. No other provision of the Rome
Treaty has been more implicated in market-building, and in defining
the relationship between the scope and authority of European law, on
the one hand, and the regulatory autonomy of the Member States, on
the other.
The Rome Treaty required the Member-States to eliminate
national barriers to intra-EU trade by the end of 1969, while
enjoining the EC's legislative organs to adopt "harmonized" EC
market regulations in a timely fashion. Article 28 states that
"[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect [MEEs] shall be prohibited between member-
states." Article 30 permits a Member State to derogate from Article
28, on grounds of public morality, public policy, public security,
health, and cultural heritage, though derogations may "not .
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States." In its jurisprudence on
Article 28, the Court would later add additional headings, including
consumer protection, the protection of working conditions, and
environmental protection. 
270
By the early 1970s, for various reasons, the Member States
had made little effort to abolish MEEs-non-tariff barriers--on their
inapplicable any conflicting provision of... national law," including national constitutional
rules. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R.
629, 643. Where the doctrine of direct effect holds, EC norms confer-directly upon
individuals-legal rights that public authorities must respect, and which can be pleaded in
the national courts. The Treaty of Rome contains no supremacy clause, and does not
provide for the direct effect of Treaty provisions or an important category of legislation,
namely, the directive. See STONE SWEET, supra note 266, at 66-71.
270. With Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ added "fiscal supervision," the "protection of public
health," the "fairness of commercial transactions," and defense of the consumer." Case
120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon),
1979 E.C.R. 649, 662. Subsequent rulings added the "improvement of working conditions,"
Case 155/80, Sergius Oebel, [1983] 1 COMMON MARKET. L.R. 390, 399, and the "protection
of the environment," Case 302/86, Comm'n v. Denmark (Danish Bottles), 1988 E.C.R. 1-
4607, 4630. Although the Court's source for these new headings is Article 28 (originally
Article 30 before renumbering in 1999 by the Treaty of Amsterdam), they are subject to PA
in exactly the same way that the Court treats claims for derogations under Article 30
(originally Article 36).
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own, and harmonization efforts had stalled in Brussels. The Court
then took the lead. In a series of rulings responding to preliminary
references from national judges, the ECJ gave almost unlimited scope
to the reach of Article 28. In Dassonville (1974), its first ruling on
Article 28, the Court announced that "all trading rules... capable of
hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" intra-EC
trade constituted MEEs, and were therefore presumptively illegal. 271
The ECJ understood the political implications of its holding for both
negative and positive integration. The unconstrained removal of
national regulations would strip bare legal regimes serving an
otherwise legitimate public interest. Further, where the EC's
legislator was unable to produce harmonized legislation in a timely
fashion, this lack of protection might not only endure, but could
weaken public and political support for integration down the road.
The ECJ therefore ruled that the Member States could, within reason,
continue to regulate the production and sale of goods in the public's
interest, pending harmonization. But it stressed that the judiciary
would control the condition of "reasonableness" strictly, on a case-
by-case basis. In its next important ruling on the matter, De Peijper
(1975), the Court held that all claimed derogations to Article 28
would be subject to a LRM test. 272  Finally, in Cassis de Dijon
(1979), the Court extended the reach of Article 28-and thus of the
Dassonville formulation and the application of LRM tests-to all
national measures, thereby capturing all market regulations,
including those applying to domestic and foreign goods without
distinction.
273
The impact of adjudicating Article 28 on the overall course of
European integration has been profound and multi-dimensional.
After Dassonville, and for more than two decades afterwards, the
litigation of Article 28 in national courts dominated the Court's case
load. The issues raised were inherently constitutional ones and, in
responding to them, the Court, not the Member States, generated the
constitutional blueprint for market federalism in Europe. In
enforcing Article 28, the legal system punched large holes in national
regulatory frameworks. As important, it also raised the costs of
political deadlock in Brussels, produced templates for harmonized
271. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837.
272. Case 104/75, Officier van Justitie v De Peijper, 1976 E.C.R. 613.
273. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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legislation, and enhanced the power of the Commission and
transnational business vis 6i vis Member State governments. As a
great deal of sophisticated empirical research has shown, the Court's
Article 28 jurisprudence was critical to "the relaunching of Europe,"
and the breaking of the impasse, through the Single European Act
(1986).274
The Court's impact on the evolution of market federalism in
Europe rests on two necessary doctrinal conditions, which should be
considered against the backdrop of its status as a trustee court.275
The first is the consolidation of direct effect and supremacy of
Article 28 in national legal orders: direct effect enabled individuals
to plead Article 28-which confers upon them trading rights-before
national judges; and supremacy required national judges to enforce
these rights when they come into conflict with national measures.
The second is the move to PA, which organizes deliberation about
the proper limits of national regulatory autonomy, given the EC's
commitment to free trade. Hans Kutscher and Pierre Pescatore were
the intellectual leaders in this move. Kutscher, who was a judge on
the German Federal Constitutional Court during its crucial
foundational period (1955-69), came to the ECJ in 1970, and served
as the President of the ECJ from 1976 to 1980. Pierre Pescatore
276
left a professorship for the ECJ in 1967, and served on the Court until
1985.
The legal system uses PA as an instrument for determining
when national regulations are, in fact, Article 28-illegal non-tariff
barriers. If a national measure does not pass the LRM test, then it
constitutes "a disguised restriction on trade between Member States"
under Article 30. One might wonder at an international court that
274. See, e.g., MICHELLE P. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS,
REGULATIONS, AND GOVERNANCE (2001); MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE, THE COURT: THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998); STONE
SWEET, supra note 2, ch. 3 (concerning the free movement of goods); Joseph H.H. Weiler,
The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
275. Its rulings on the Treaty can only be "overturned" by unanimous vote of the
Member States, which now number twenty-seven.
276. Pescatore, a law professor, mentions proportionality as a general principle of law in
a 1970 article, written while he was on the Court. Pierre Pescatore, Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms in the System of the European Communities, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 350 (1970).
277. The ECJ may proceed through each stage of PA, including balancing in the strict
sense, although the LRM test clearly has the most bite and importance. In addition, the ECJ
sometimes integrates elements of balancing in the strict sense into necessity analysis. See
FEDERICO ORTINO, BASIC LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR THE LIBERALISATION OF TRADE: A
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claims for itself the authority to generate and consider alternative
means to achieving policy goals. After all, national governments and
legislators have already balanced the interests at play in such cases.
In response to this concern, it would seem, the ECJ quickly
developed the practice of identifying alternative, Article 28-
compatible, policies that one could reasonably expect the Member
State to have adopted in the first place. In such cases, the Court goes
out of its way to demonstrate that its preferred options are more
appropriate and effective means of achieving the pleaded state
interest, in addition to being less restrictive on intra-EC trade. As a
strategic move, it would seem that the more easily the Court can
generate a list of reasonably available, at least as effective,
alternatives to the defendant's Article-28 illegal measures, the more
the Court's policymaking role can be defended. We will explore this
point further in the next section, with respect to WTO practice, and
again in the conclusion.
In the EC/EU context, the Courts' move to proportionality
can be characterized as having "constitutional" importance-or is
inherently constitutional-in at least two ways. First, when it
deploys PA, the ECJ is doing what constitutional and supreme courts
do, namely, managing tensions and conflicts between rights and
freedoms, on the one hand, and the power of the EC/EU and of
Member States, on the other. Second, harnessed to the
"constitutional" doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, PA
constitutes a mechanism of coordination between the supranational
legal order and national legal orders. When the ECJ first embraced it
at the end of the 1960s, proportionality was native to only one
Member State: Germany. In its jurisprudence on the free movement
of goods, indirect sex discrimination, and other legal domains, the
ECJ required national judges to use PA when they reviewed the
legality of national law and practice under EC law. As has been
documented, some national judges initially resisted this
"obligation. 278  As the formalization of the principle of
proportionality has proceeded, resistance has been steadily withering,
a process reinforced by choices made by the European Court of
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC AND WTO LAW 471 (2004). For a recent overview of the
state of PA in the Court's approach to Article 28, see Opinion of Advocate General Miguel
Poiares Maduro, C-434/04, Ahokainen v. Virallinen Syyttiiji (Public Prosecutor), 2006
E.C.R. 1-09171, 23-32.




2. The European Convention on Human Rights
The ECHR279 is the most effective human rights regime in the
world, today covering the territory of 46 states and more than 800
million people. The Convention, which entered into force in 1953,
established a basic catalogue of rights binding on the signatories, and
new institutions charged with monitoring and enforcing compliance.
Distinctive at its conception, the ECHR has evolved into an intricate
legal system. The High Contracting Parties, in successive treaty
revisions, have steadily upgraded the regime's scope and capacities.
They have added new rights, enhanced the powers of the European
Court of Human Rights, and strengthened the links between
individual applicants and the regime. For its part, the Strasbourg
Court has built a sophisticated jurisprudence, whose progressive
tenor and expansive reach have helped to propel the system forward.
Today, the Court is an important, autonomous source of authority on
the nature and content of fundamental rights in Europe. In addition
to providing justice in individual cases, it works to identify and to
consolidate universal standards of rights protection, in the face of
wide national diversity. In a 1995 decision, the Court called the
ECHR "a constitutional instrument" of European public law 28; and
Luzius Wildhaber, as President of the Court (1998-2007), argued
strongly in favor of enhancing its "constitutional" functions.28'
The ECHR, it was originally assumed, established minimal,
lowest-common denominator, standards for basic human rights.
2 82
Yet, today, it is obvious that the Court routinely develops what have
283been, for many Member States, "new" rights and remedies. In
279. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
280. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995).
281. Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human
Rights?, 23 HuM. RTs. L.J. 161 (2002).
282. See Danny Nicol, Original Intent and the European Convention on Human Rights,
2005 PuB. L. 152.
283. According to the Court, the ECHR is not a "static" but a "living instrument," and
its contents must be interpreted to secure effective rights protection for individuals, as
European society evolves. Alongside this teleology of purpose and effectiveness, the Court
has developed an overarching comparative methodology, one result of which is to ensure a
creative role for itself In defining the content and scope of Convention rights, the Court will
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response, Member States have neither rolled back their commitments
nor curbed the Court. Instead, they have added new rights to the
Convention catalogue, using a series of optional protocols; and they
have introduced major organizational and procedural changes, the
most important of which came through Protocol 11. Protocol 11,
which entered into force in November 1998, centralized
administrative authority to process claims in the Court. 28 4  Under
Protocol 11, individuals petition the Court directly, after exhausting
domestic remedies. Most Member States have also enhanced the
status of Convention rights through "domestification": the
incorporation of the Convention into domestic law. In most cases,
incorporation means that individuals may plead Convention rights
before national judges, who can directly enforce them. A victim of
its success, the post-Protocol 11 system is chronically overloaded,
with a backlog of over 100,000 pending cases already judged to be
admissible. In 2006, the Court received more than 50,000 individual
petitions and issued 1,560 judgments on the merits.285
The Convention proclaims some state obligations to be firm
prohibitions (of torture, degrading treatment, and slavery),286 but
most rights are "qualified" in various ways. Most important for our
purposes, Articles 8-11 are qualified by a necessity clause. States
may only "interfere" with the exercise of rights to privacy and
respect for family life, and the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion, expression, assembly, and association, when such
interferences are "necessary in a democratic society" and "in the
interests of' some specified public good. Legitimate state purposes
typically survey the state of law and practice in the Member States, and sometimes beyond.
Where it finds an emerging consensus on a new, higher standard of rights protection among
states, it may move to consolidate this consensus, as a point of Convention law binding upon
all members. Formally, the Court's role is restricted to determining whether a Member State
has infringed upon Convention rights in any specific case. Increasingly, it would seem that
the Court considers that an important oracular function inheres in its jurisdiction. Today, the
Court is the unrivalled master of the Convention, a posture it uses to construct European
fundamental rights in a prospective and progressive way.
284. In the beginning, the European Commission of Human Rights (established in
1954), was charged with monitoring compliance with rights under the Convention, filtering
applications, and bringing enforcement actions to the European Court of Human Rights
(established in 1959). With Protocol 11, the Commission was abolished and its most
important functions were given to the Court.
285. EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, p 13,available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/4729C3F9-D38F-42AC-8584-BCA56E26BC5C/O/
AnnualReport_2006.pdf. The 2007 Report has not yet been released.
286. These are contained in Articles 3 and 4, respectively.
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mentioned include "national security," "public safety," "the
economic well-being of the country," "the prevention of disorder or
crime," "the protection of health or morals," and "the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others." These rationales for restricting
rights are exhaustive: Article 18 prohibits states from infringements
"for any purpose other than those ... prescribed.,
287
The Court subjects all Convention rights to balancing, 288 and
has developed a German-style proportionality approach to Articles 8-
11, and to Article 14 (non discrimination on sex, race, color,
language, religion, political opinion, national origin, etc.). Like
national constitutional courts, the Court faced the problem of
determining the standard for judging necessity, but the problem was
exacerbated by wide national variance in approaches to judicial
review. By the early 1970s, the proportionality framework was
routinely used in Germany, and was just emerging in the EU under
the ECJ's tutelage, but PA was virtually unknown in all of the other
High Contracting Parties of the Council of Europe, with the
exception of Switzerland. 289  The main agent of this development
was Professor Jochen Frowein, a member of the Commission on
Human Rights (1973-93), its Vice President (1981-93), and long
associated with the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and
International Law, Heidelberg, including as director.
The Court's turn to proportionality was heavily conditioned
by its confrontation with cases coming from the U.K., where the
"Wednesbury reasonableness" test-a type of highly deferential,
"rational basis" standard-governed applications for judicial review
of government acts. 290  This conflict-between German-style PA
and U.K.-style reasonableness-is a deeply structural one,
implicating the most basic constitutional precepts of a legal system
wherever it arises. Simplifying a complex reality, the U.K.'s
accession to the EC led judges to create exceptions to certain core
precepts of parliamentary sovereignty. The ECJ's supremacy
287. See supra note 279.
288. "In practice, the European Court engages in balancing in the context of almost
every Convention right." Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review,
65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174, 182 (2006).
289. Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, Introduction: The Reception of the ECHR in
National Legal Orders, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEMS 19 (Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller eds., 2008).
290. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 K.B. 223
(U.K.).
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doctrines meant relaxing the U.K.'s doctrine of implied repeal and
enforcing EC law, even against subsequent law; and the move to
proportionality meant evolving new remedies, and the relaxation of
the Wednesbury standard. But traditionalists could nonetheless assert
that these exceptions were limited to those legal domains governed
directly by EC law. Because the ECHR potentially governs virtually
all domains of law and judicial practice, the Strasbourg Court's
adoption of PA had the potential of fatally undermining not only
Wednesbury, but every other practical implication of parliamentary
sovereignty.
The Court's first serious dealings with the limitation clauses
of the Convention came in Handyside v. the United Kingdom
(1976),' 9' an Article 10 case involving the censorship of a book on
public morals grounds. In its ruling, the Court observed that "the
adjective 'necessary,' within the meaning of Article 10 (2) is not
synonymous with 'indispensable' [and] neither has it the flexibility
of such expressions as. . . 'admissible,' . . . 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or
'desirable."' Nevertheless, it was "for national authorities to make
the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need
implied by the notion of 'necessity' in this context." 292 The Court
then found that the U.K. had exercised its "margin of appreciation"-
today jargon denoting the discretion of states to strike the proper
balance in the first instance-on the matter properly, but insisted that
the use of such authority must "go hand in hand with... European
supervision. ',293 The Court did not go further. In Dudgeon v. the
United Kingdom (1981),294 however, the Court declared measures
that criminalized homosexual acts to be "disproportionate," on LRM
grounds, in the context of the right to privacy (Article 8). Building
on Dudgeon, the Court then entrenched a version of PA as a general
approach to qualified rights.
In doing so, the Court became a powerful agent in PA's
diffusion into national legal orders. In two more recent privacy
cases, Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (1999),2 95 and Peck v.
United Kingdom (2003),296 the Court strongly criticized U.K. courts
291. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
292. Id. at 22.
293. Id. at 23.
294. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1981).
295. Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1999).
296. Peck v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41 (2003).
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for continuing to apply Wednesbury rather than a LRM-based
necessity test. In Peck, the Court noted that U.K. judges refused to
entertain pleadings based on the Convention except where claimants
could show that public authorities had acted "irrationally in the sense
that they had taken leave of their senses, or had acted in a manner in
which no reasonable authority could have acted." In both Smith and
Grady (unlawful discrimination against homosexuals in the armed
services) and Peck (unlawful broadcasting of closed circuit camera
footage) the Court held that the absence of necessity review by the
U.K. courts, per se, constituted a breach of Article 13: "Everyone
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority., 297  In both cases, the Court noted that U.K. judges had
strongly implied that they would have found for the applicants, but
for the Wednesbury restriction.298 Thus, it can be argued that the
Court was helping U.K. judges overcome a restriction that had made
it impossible for them to fulfill their obligations under the
Convention.
Peck's application for judicial review was rejected by the
High Court in 1997, and the European Court's judgment on the
merits did not come until 2003. In the meantime, the 1998 Human
Rights Act299 incorporated the ECHR into U.K. law and, in 1999, the
House of Lords adopted PA as the procedure for determining
necessity. 3°° Under the Act, individuals may plead the ECHR before
297. Id. at 137:
Where a public authority has exceeded its powers or has acted irrationally or
has reached a decision in breach of the rules of procedural fairness, then a
person aggrieved may challenge the decision by means of judicial review. If a
decision is so disproportionate to its intended objective as to be irrational, the
Court will strike it down. The English courts do not recognise proportionality
as a separate head of judicial review. However, in the case of R. (Alconbury
Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the
Regions [sic] [2001] 2 Weekly Law Reports 1389), Lord Slynn of the House of
Lords stated obiter dictum that: 'I consider that even without reference to the
Human Rights Act 1998 the time has come to recognize that this principle [of
proportionality] is part of English administrative law, not only when judges are
dealing with Community acts but also when they are dealing with acts subject
to domestic law.'
298. Id. See also Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1999).
299. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, available at http://www.opsi.gov. uk/acts/acts1998
/19980042.htm.
300. In de Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands,
and Housing, 1 A.C. 69, 80 (P.C. 1998), the Privy Council of the House of Lords observed
that to determine whether a limitation on Convention rights was arbitrary or excessive the
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U.K. judges, and judges may enforce Convention rights. A court,
however, may not annul or disapply statutes that violate the
Convention-it may only issue a declaration of incompatibility. The
Government and Parliament can maintain incompatible statutes, but
they must give reasons for why they have chosen to do so (the
doctrine of implied repeal does not apply). The judicial politics of
the Human Rights Act are in rapid development, and PA will be
central to how the relationship between judges and legislators
evolves.
Although U.K. courts profess to have abandoned the
"reasonableness" test when it comes to rights review under the Act,
they do not always apply the LRM test with rigor. Many judges,
even those on high courts, consider necessity analysis to be an
inherently legislative mode of decision-making; some use the
necessity stage merely to affirm legislative discretion, even
sovereignty. In doing so, they expose themselves to censure under
the Convention. In Hirst v. United Kingdom,30 1 for example, a 2005
case involving the voting rights of incarcerated prisoners, the
Strasbourg Court condemned the U.K., in part, on the grounds that
neither the U.K. Parliament, nor the judiciary, 30 2 had "ever sought to
weigh the competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a
blanket ban on the right of a convicted prisoner to vote.' 30 3  In
consequence, the British and the Scottish Governments are now
preparing reforms, while taking care to build a record of their own
proportionality-based determinations. 3
0 4
Under the Court's supervision, PA is now in the process of
diffusing to every national legal order in Europe, where it will
typically be absorbed as a constitutional principle. In the territory
covered by the Convention today, the failure on the part of national
courts should ask themselves "whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important
to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative
objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective."
301. Hirst v. United Kingdom, App. No. 74025/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005).
302. Writing for the Divisional Court, Lord Justice Kennedy stated: "The European
Court also requires that the means employed restrict the implied Convention rights to vote
are not disproportionate, and that is the point at which, as it seems to me, it is appropriate for
this court to defer to the legislature." Id. at para. 16.
303. Id. at paras. 79-80.
304. See Isobel White, Convicted Prisoners and the Franchise, (House of Commons




courts to use PA when they adjudicate qualified rights and non-
discrimination cases is itself an infringement of Convention rights-
to judicial remedy. Further, the scope of the proportionality principle
extends to the exercise of all public authority. In Hirst, the Court
pointedly criticized the U.K. Parliament, as well, for having failed to
deliberate the proportionality of legislation when it was adopted.
Proportionality is a transnational principle that casts an ever-
deepening shadow over both national rights adjudication and
policymaking more broadly conceived.
As in the EC/EU, PA constitutes a basic mechanism of
coordinating between the ECHR and national legal systems, and
among diverse national systems. In our view, this type of
coordination is inherently constitutional. As it has developed in the
ECHR, PA is the means by which the Court supervises how states
use their margin of appreciation to delimit rights on the ground.
Further, the Court has developed a simple comparative method for
determining when "new" rights have emerged, and when the scope of
existing rights expands. Typically, it will raise the standard of rights
protection, in a given area, when a sufficient number of states no
longer limit rights in that area for reasons of public interest. The
margin of appreciation enjoyed by states shrinks as consensus on
higher standards of rights protection emerges among states, which
then shifts the balance in favor of the right claimant. The Court can
thus claim that there is some external, "objective" means of
determining the weights to be given to the values in conflict, and it
can usually (until recently) claim that its bias is majoritarian and
transnational.
Finally, we have focused on the U.K. case, stressing the
Strasbourg Court's choice to require national officials to assess the
proportionality of acts that limit Convention rights. Yet, for the vast
majority of national judges operating under the Convention, adopting
PA enhances significantly their authority relative to that of legislative
and executive officials. In strongly monist Netherlands, where the
prohibition of judicial review of statute trumps the bill of rights, the
Convention now plays the role of a shadow constitution, or surrogate
charter of rights, since the ECHR is directly enforceable by the
courts, whereas Dutch rights are not.30 5 The turn to PA requires the
Dutch courts to do what before they were forbidden to do, and they
305. See supra note 289, at 686.
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are now doing it. The same is true of the situation in France. The
courts now review the Conventionality of French laws, despite the
prohibition of judicial review, and they do so using a proportionality
standard, which is a far more intrusive standard than those (manifest
error, illegality, ultra vires) that PA replaced. In Italy,
proportionality is driving out the more relaxed reasonableness
standard. We could go on; but our point is that, in virtually every
European state, the relationship between judicial power and all other
public authority is being redrawn.3 °6 The major exception is
Germany, where PA had already been constitutionalized. Once the
Strasbourg Court adopted PA, it created the potential for conflict
with the GFCC, since individuals may apply to Strasbourg when they
believe that German courts have failed to balance correctly.
30 7
3. The World Trade Organization
The WTO, which entered into force on January 1, 1995,
absorbed or replaced institutional features that had evolved under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT-
WTO's purpose is to facilitate the expansion of international trade,
through legislating and enforcing trade law for its members:
sovereign states. In 1948, when the GATT entered into force, "anti-
legalism" reigned in the regime. 308 The treaty did not provide for
TDR, and diplomats pointedly excluded lawyers from GATT organs.
In the 1950s, TDR nonetheless emerged, in the form of the Panel
System. Panels, of three to five members, usually GATT diplomats,
acquired their authority through the consent of two disputing states.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the system underwent a process of
judicialization. 309  States began to litigate disputes aggressively,
306. The volume, A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 289, examines the influence of the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights on eighteen national legal systems. Among other things, the book
tracks and evaluates comparatively the effects of decisions on the part of national courts to
adopt PA. For a comparative assessment, see supra note 289, at 698-701.
307. Major conflicts have, in fact, ensued. See Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad & Anne
Weber, The Reception Process in France and Germany, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE
IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS, 35-37,41.
308. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE
SYSTEM 70-71 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985); Robert E. Hudec, The Judicialization of
GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN WHOSE INTEREST?: DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 137 (M.H. Hart and D. Steger eds., 1992).
309. See Alec Stone Sweet, The New GA TT: Dispute Resolution and the ludicialization
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deploying lawyers who used standard litigation techniques; jurists
and trade specialists replaced generalist diplomats on panels; and
panels began treating their output as case law, a process encouraged
and ratified by the litigating lawyers. Judicialization helped to
generate the conditions necessary for the emergence of the WTO,
which established a system of adjudication on the basis of
compulsory jurisdiction. The panel system was, in part retained, but
it is today crowned by a high appellate instance, called the Appellate
Body (AB).
By our definition, the AB of the WTO is a trustee court. The
myriad treaty instruments comprising the substantive law of the
WTO can only be revised by unanimous vote (of 151 members
today). The legal system provides third party dispute settlement to
states, but virtually all important disputes are linked to questions of
treaty interpretation. Thus, as in any constitutional regime, TDR and
rule-adaptation (constitutional lawmaking) are nested activities.
States are fully aware of this fact, and they use the panel system and
the AB, in part, to evolve treaty rules they favor, and to block
interpretations to which they reject. The AB is gradually exerting
dominance over the legal evolution of the regime, which is to be
expected given the legal system's steady case load, and the AB's
trustee status.
The core legal text is the GATT (1947, 1994), which lays
down the basic rules and principles of international trade. National
law and practices related to taxation-customs regulatory
transparency, subsidies, currency and balance of payment
management, and the like-may all be manipulated in ways that will
make them discriminatory, non-tariff barriers to trade. The GATT
seeks to make such manipulation illegal, through a mixture of rules
and standards governing such policies.
Unlike the post-Single European Act EU, the GATT-WTO
has been unsuccessful at generating "positive integration": law to
address the negative externalities of trade. By default, Article XX
(GATT) has become the main site for testing the limits of state
competences to deal with such problems unilaterally, through
litigation. Article XX contains a list of "General Exceptions" to the
of the Trade Regime, in LAW ABOvE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE
LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 118, 124 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., Univ. Press of Fl. 1997); Stone
Sweet, supra note 19, at 165.
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GATT. 310  Measures that come under one of the headings listed in
Article XX, and meet the conditions that have been developed by
panels and the AB, are permitted. Permissible exceptions include
those national "measures" that are judged to be "necessary": "to
protect public morals" (XX [a]); "to protect human, animal, plant life
or health (XX [b]); and "to secure compliance" with "customs
enforcement" and "the protection of patents, trademarks and
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices" (XX [d]).
Other headings include exceptions for measures "relating to": "the
products of prison labour" (XX [e]); and "the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources" (XX [g]).
In a regime otherwise dominated by free trade values and
legislative inertia, adjudicating Article XX has become the main
"forum" in the WTO for deliberating countervailing interests and
values. 31 1 In response to litigation and in an effort control the use of
these exceptions and advance GATT-WTO law, panels and the AB
developed a host of balancing techniques, often focusing on
proportionality. Much of the law, politics, and scholarly discourse
concerned with the question of if and how trade law can
accommodate "societal values" other than free trade-including
312 33314_public health, human rights,313 and environmental protection 3 -
is organized by the AB's Article XX jurisprudence, and speculation
on how the AB will decide cases in the future. The AB has been
successful at focusing attention on Article XX by making it clear that
310. The list begins after the "chapeau," which states: "Subject to the requirement that
such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures..." General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 1l, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
311. We focus here on disputes in which Article XX exceptions are pleaded by States.
The legal system also uses PA, for varied purposes, to deal with disputes arising under other
WTO agreements. See Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law in
Comparative Perspective, 42 TEX. INT'L. L.J., 371, 416-23 (2007).
312. See, e.g., Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tirk, The WTO Impact on Internal
Regulations: A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in TRADE AND HUMAN
HEALTH AND SAFETY 77,77-78 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2006).
313. See, e.g., Sarah Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A
Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 133 (2002).
314. See, e.g., Varamon Ramangkura, Thai Shrimp, Sea Turtles, Mangrove Forests and
the WTO: Innovative Environmental Protection Under the International Trade Regime, 15
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 677 (2003).
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WTO judges considers these values to be, at least a priori, as
important as free trade. 315  Moreover, the AB has at times decided
that they outweigh trading rights.
The LRM test, with its "reasonably available alternative"
corollary, emerged in a pre-WTO dispute, U.S.-Section 337 of the
Tar ifAct of 1937 (1989).316 In this dispute, the EC, pleading Article
III, 4 (GATT),3 17 successfully challenged a U.S. measure that
treated patent infringement litigation differently, depending on the
site of production of the good. The statute in question blocked access
to the federal courts of cases involving foreign products
manufactured under an American patent, pushing them into an
agency, the International Trade Commission, where procedures and
remedies were less advantageous for imports. The U.S. pleaded
Article XX (d): the measure was "necessary to secure compliance
with laws . . . relating to . . . the protection of patents." 31 8 Indeed, it
claimed that Section 337 "provided the only means of enforcement"
available to it, since patent infringement cases involving goods
manufactured abroad would always pose special problems (service of
315. A message reinforced by the AB's insistence that claims to exceptions under
Article XX must take place before Panels may proceed to analysis under the "chapeau,"
which addresses free trade concerns, e.g., whether the measure under review constitutes "an
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries" or is a "disguised restriction on
international trade." GATT, supra note 310, at art. XX. See Appellate Body Report, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, paras. 112-22
WT/DS58/AB[R (Oct. 12, 1998). On the relationship between proportionality analysis and
the review of state measures under the chapeau, see Andenas & Zleptnig, supra note 311, at
413-15. They state, inter alia, that "the AB focuses on the balancing of competing rights,
interests, and obligations as a pre-dominant feature within chapeau analysis... [a] "process
that resembles a proportionality analysis." Id. at 414-15.
316. GATT Panel Report: United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov.
7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (L/6439-36S/345 36th Supp.) at 345 [hereinafter GATT Panel
Report].
317. This reads as follows:
Article III: National Treatment on International Taxation and Regulation
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation
of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
318. GATT, supra note 310, art. XX(d).
2008]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W
process, enforcement of judgments, etc.). 3 19  For its part, the EC
could see no reason why the federal courts should not be used, and
the Panel agreed.
What is crucial is the disagreement about the standard to be
applied in necessity review: the EC argued for the application of a
LRM test, and the U.S. advocated a rational basis standard. 321 It
would seem that each side was proceeding on the basis of their
understanding of how LRM tests are used in their own systems. In
European national constitutional law, and under the Treaty of Rome
and the ECHR, it is not rare to see statutes and administrative
measures pass necessity review. In the U.S., the outcome is heavily
prejudged: once a court decides to proceed to strict scrutiny, the act
under review is likely to be invalidated under a LRM test. "Strict in
theory, fatal in fact" goes the maxim. Indeed, the U.S. argued that:
"Under the Community's proposed standard, adoption by a contracting
party of a regime different from that adopted by other States, for
example for the protection of human, animal or plant life and health or
of public morals, could never be justified ... since it would have a
trade restrictive effect and could not be shown to be objectively
'necessary.'"
The three-member Panel, which included a former ECJ Judge
and proponent of PA, Pierre Pescatore, simply adopted a solution that
would be familiar to any consumer of the ECJ's Article 28 (EC) case
law, well-established in 1989:
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure
inconsistent with another GATT provision as
"necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative
measure which it could reasonably be expected to
employ and which is not inconsistent with other
GATT provisions is available to it. By the same
token, in cases where a measure consistent with other
GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures
319. GATT Panel Report, supra note 316, paras. 3.62, 3.63.
320. The U.S. had argued that: "The requirement [of necessity] did not impose an
obligation to use the least trade restrictive measure that could be envisaged; this would invite
continuous disputes regarding measures that the CONTRACTING PARTIES had clearly
intended to exempt from the obligations of the General Agreement." GATT Panel Report,
supra note 316, para 3.59.
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reasonably available to it, that which entails the least
degree of inconsistency with other GATT
provisions.321
As a technique of judicial review, the application of LRM
analysis in GATT-WTO proceedings has proved to be as intrusive as
it is in any national constitutional system. Much like their ECJ
counterparts, WTO judges will block claimed exceptions to GATT
rules when a national measure fails proportionality, but only after
scrutinizing, in micro detail, why and how the measure was adopted
and applied in the first place. With necessity analysis, we would
emphasize that such rejection is conditioned by a constraint. As in
the EC, WTO judges routinely identify specific, "reasonably
available," less-restrictive-on-trade, policy alternatives that would
pass the LRM test. Indeed, one might consider whether such a
burden constitutes a kind of informal duty that binds the judge who
would censure a measure on LRM grounds.
The next case involving necessity review under Article XX
illustrates the point. In Thai Cigarettes (1990),322 the U.S. attacked
Thailand's treatment of imported cigarettes, taking its arguments on
necessity directly from U.S.-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1937,
the case it had just lost.323 Thailand taxed foreign-produced
cigarettes higher than the domestic equivalent, 324 and subjected
importers to a special licensing procedure.325 In response, Thailand
invoked Article XX (b), which permits national measures that are
"necessary to protect human ... life or health." The measures under
review, it claimed, were designed "to protect the public from harmful
ingredients in imported cigarettes, and to reduce the consumption of
cigarettes in Thailand., 326  The Panel then gave a polite bow to
Thailand,327 recognizing the importance of the interests being
321. Id. recital 5.26.
322. GATT Panel Report: Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (DS1O/R-37S/200) [hereinafter Thai
Cigarettes].
323. See, e.g., id., para. 3.
324. In violation of art. III (GATT), on national treatment, and taxation.
325. In violation of art. XI (GATT), prohibiting quantitative restrictions.
326. Thai Cigarettes, para. 76.
327. Id., para. 73. "[T]he Panel accepted that smoking constituted a serious risk to
human health and that consequently measures designed to reduce the consumption of
cigarettes fell within the scope of Article XX(b). The Panel [also] noted that this provision
clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over trade liberalization;
however, for a measure to be covered by Article XX(b) it had to be 'necessary."' Id.
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pleaded, before moving to LRM analysis. Thailand could prevail
"only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the
General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand
could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy
objectives. 328
Our interest here is on how the Panel fleshed out this
standard. 329 The Panel suggested that other countries use labeling
and "ingredient disclosure" requirements to permit "governments to
control and the public to be informed of, the content of cigarettes."
Indeed, it went so far as to state that: "a non-discriminatory
regulation.., coupled with a ban on unhealthy substances, would be
an alternative consistent with the GATT." On the issue of reducing
smoking, the Panel suggested that Thailand had a wide range of
GATT-consistent options available to it: it could launch a publicity
campaign against smoking; it could ban advertising of all cigarettes,
or smoking in public places; it could enhance warnings on cigarette
packages; it could use the state monopoly-the Thai Tobacco
Monopoly-to restrict supply and raise prices. Thailand failed the
necessity test (paragraph 81) precisely because the Panel could so
easily come up with less-restrictive-on-trade alternatives.3
30
Once the new WTO legal system began operating, panels and
the AB simply adopted the LRM approach to necessity analysis,
refining it over time.33' In WTO rulings rejecting an Article XX
exception on necessity grounds coming after Thai Cigarettes, one
finds the same compulsion to access the legitimizing resources of
Pareto optimality. 332  As it has developed, the WTO version of
necessity analysis often absorbs the balancing in the strict sense
phase, importing elements of Alexy's "law of balancing" into its
jurisprudence. In Korea-Beef (2001), the AB provided a subtle
analysis of the proportionality of national measures, with regard to
328. Id. para. 75.
329. Id. paras. 72-80.
330. Id. para. 81.
331. As far as we are aware, systematic treatment of the development and use of PA by
GATT panels and the WTO "courts" does not exist, but see Alan 0. Sykes, The Least
Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 403 (2003), which focuses on the evolution of
necessity analysis and its relationship to "cost-benefit analysis" under conditions of
regulatory uncertainty.
332. See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef paras. 162-66, WT/DS 161/AB/R, WT/DS 169/AB/R, DSR 2001:1, 5 (Dec.
11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea BeeJ].
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the public health exception, and clarified its approach to necessity in
important dicta:
The more vital or important... [the] common
interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept
as "necessary" a measure designed as an enforcement
instrument. There are other aspects of the
enforcement measure to be considered in evaluating
that measure as "necessary." One is the extent to
which the measure contributes to the realization of the
end pursued, the securing of compliance with the law
or regulation at issue. The greater the contribution,
the more easily a measure might be considered to be
"necessary."... [D]etermination of whether a
measure ... [is] "necessary" . . . involves in every
case a process of weighing and balancing a series of
factors [that] include the contribution made by the
compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or
regulation at issue, the importance of the common
interests or values protected by that law or regulation,
and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation
on imports or exports.
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, a German, a veteran senior official of the
European Commission, and a leading proponent of PA in trade
law,333 chaired the AB college that decided this case, and likely
wrote the decision.
Today, scholars who argue that the WTO has been
"constitutionalized" point, among other things, to the general,
constitutional principle of proportionality. 334
V. ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION
Over the past half-century, most of the world's most powerful
333. Mr. Ehlermann sat on the AB from 1995-2001, finishing as its chairman.
Previously he had served the European Commission as Director-General of the Legal
Service (1977-87), and Director-General for Competition (1990-95). See Biography of Dr.
Dr. h.c. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, http://www.wilmerhale.com/claus-dieter_ehlermann/ (last
visited Oct. 20, 2008).
334. See, e.g., CASS, supra note 4, at 34; Andenas & Zleptnig, supra note 311, at 425-
26.
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high courts have adopted PA to deal with the most politically salient,
and potentially controversial, issues to which they could expect to be
exposed. The same is true of the courts of the EC/EU, the ECHR,
and the WTO. Judges have embraced proportionality for similar
reasons. Given the constitutional texts they have been asked to
interpret and enforce, PA made it easy for them to prioritize the
values that the polity itself has chosen to prioritize, even in the
difficult situations in which these values would come into tension or
conflict. Proportionality review is inescapably an exercise in applied
constitutional (or international) lawmaking. But it also fits the
mission of modem trustee courts, who govern political rulers by
regulating the exercise of state authority in light of higher law norms
that are assumed to be both constitutive and permanent. In each of
the cases examined, courts first moved toward proportionality
tentatively, before embracing it as an overarching principle of the
legality. Today, judges around the world claim that PA is essential to
the performance of their duties, a position the rest of us might
consider more seriously. In our view, proportionality is today a
foundational element of global constitutionalism.
We have also found that PA constitutes an important
doctrinal underpinning for the expansion of judicial authority
globally. This finding rests on certain necessary conditions, the most
important of which is the prior turn to the New Constitutionalism. In
Germany, Central Europe, and South Africa, the move to rights and
PA was linked to democratization, given recent authoritarian pasts.
In Canada, rights adjudication under the Bill of Rights (1960), a text
possessing no supra-legislative rank, was infirm, stillborn. Under the
Charter (1982), which has constitutional rank, the Canadian Supreme
Court not only adopted PA but, through experience, rights have
become a kind of civic religion in Canada, constraining in practice
Parliament's use of its powers to override the Court's decisions.
New Zealand maintained legislative sovereignty and modeled its Bill
of Rights Act on the Canadian. Yet its courts, citing the Canadian
Court's Charter jurisprudence as authority, embraced PA, thereby
neutralizing its traditional, Wednesbury-based, deference posture.
The move raises the question whether parliamentary sovereignty,
traditionally conceived in Commonwealth countries, will survive
anywhere.
More broadly, in every system examined, we found that a
court's turn toward PA generated processes that served to enhance,
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radically, the judiciary's role in both lawmaking and constitutional
development. To the extent that it is robust and on-going, PA
inevitably becomes a primary mechanism of a polity's
judicialization, and it triggers secondary mechanisms. Where the
move to PA is successful, a court induces all other relevant actors in
the system-future litigants and their lawyers, governmental
officials, legal scholars-to think of their roles in terms of
proportionality. In the cases examined, that is exactly what has
occurred. To be a skilled social actor in the constitutional politics of
Germany, Canada, Israel, the EU, the ECHR, or the WTO means
learning to reason and deploy the language of PA. For proof, consult
lawyers' briefs to the proportionality judge, read the law professor's
commentary on the court's rulings, or track the increasing extent to
which non-judicial officials apply the principles of proportionality-
and of the court's case law-to their own lawmaking. As a mode of
judicial governance, PA casts a deep shadow on the lawmaking of
non-judicial actors, while providing judges with a flexible means of
managing sensitive legal questions in potentially explosive political
environments.
We noted that the process through which proportionality has
spread exhibits a viral quality. The theory presented in Part II helps
us to understand part of what is going on, but only in the abstract.
The case studies supplement this understanding, and allow us to
make at least the following points, each of which deserves more
attention in future research.
First, the emergence and early consolidation of PA depended
heavily on the influence of legal scholars on judging, in Germany,
and then on the influence of Germany on European law. Second,
specific identifiable agents (judges and law professors-turned-judges)
were instrumental in bringing PA to treaty-based regimes, including
Hans Kutscher and Pierre Pescatore (to the ECJ), Jochen Frowein (to
the ECHR), Pescatore and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (to the WTO). In
principle, one could map the network of individuals, and the
connections between institutions, that facilitated the spread of PA.
Again, one would find pervasive German influence. Third, in
Europe, the EC/EU and the ECHR developed features of hierarchy
that made possible what Powell and Dimaggio call a process of
"coercive isomorphism": the diffusion of institutional forms and
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practices through legal obligation backed up by monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms. 335  The Luxembourg and Strasbourg
courts commanded other national courts to deploy PA, and
announced that they would supervise how national judges actually do
so. The codification of proportionality as positive law, through the
EU Charter of Rights, for example, will further stigmatize resistance
to the general movement. Fourth, as more and more courts adopted
PA, the dynamics of diffusion became subject to logics of mimesis
and increasing-returns (band-wagon effects): courts began copying
what they took to be the emerging best-practice standard, thus
ensuring the result. This process, one of choice not duty, can also be
expressed in terms of what Powell and Dimaggio call "normative
isomorphism, ' ' 336 which explains the diffusion of forms through the
building of normative consensus among an elite group, whose claim
to authority and influence is knowledge-based. Judges and law
professors are such a group, and those committed to PA are relatively
coherent and self-regarding.
Although one finds firm support for the basic claims made in
Part II of the paper, it is also clear that the kind of simple theory we
have offered is neither meant or equipped to deal with much of the
variance in how different courts actually use PA, on the ground as it
were. The diffusion of PA adds layers of complexity to any truly
comparative analysis, and some of this complexity will always
escape attempts to build more general theory. Thus, though we find
important, theoretically significant, similarities across cases, at least
at some moderately high level of abstraction, we also confront
important differences in how judges use PA, across time and
jurisdiction. Most important, even a cursory survey of practice will
show that, in every system, judges shape PA to their own purposes,
with use. Further, we have every reason to expect that how
proportionality is actually deployed, with what impact on the polity,
will change over time.
One source of change will be exogenous: new issues and
changing circumstances will lead judges to use PA differently. In
this mode of adjudication, it is context, not the law per se, that varies.
335. Paul J. Dimaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 67-69 (Paul J. Dimaggio and Walter
W. Powell eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1991).
336. Id. at 70-74.
[47:72
PROPORTIONALITYBALANCING
Change may also occur endogenously. A court, in processing a
stream of cases in the same policy domain, may choose to accord
more deference to legislative choices, over time, to the extent that
lawmakers demonstrate that they are taking seriously proportionality
requirements when they legislate. This latter dynamic, found
wherever proportionality review is minimally effective, constitutes a
mechanism of institutionalization (positive feedback). On the other
hand, a court is likely to be stricter on necessity when PA is less
entrenched as a general mode of policymaking, not least, because the
Court may see the need to "teach" the basics of PA to lawmakers.
Further, a point that has generated a great deal of controversy in
some jurisdictions (notably Canada and the ECHR), courts may
expand and contract the discretion they grant to lawmakers, at the
suitability or necessity stage, when it is not confident that it has
anything to teach them. This flexibility, which we count as a virtue
rather a vice of PA, is never immune from attack by those who
believe that a more determinate and principled approach to rights
adjudication is possible, or that PA is just a fancy way to package
judicial policy-making.
Variance in how courts conceive the nature and purpose of
each stage of PA may also be meaningful. In Canada, most laws that
fail proportionality testing do so at the necessity phase, and judges
rarely move to the "balancing in the strict sense" stage-although
there is evidence that this reticence might be changing. Judges may
be acting on the view that post-LRM balancing exposes them too
much as balancers, that is, as lawmakers. Like their counterparts on
the ECJ, in the AB of the WTO, and on the Strasbourg Court,
Canadian judges often engage in (what the German and Israeli Courts
would consider to be) defacto "balancing in the strict sense," which
they build in to suitability or necessity analysis. The American
Supreme Court may be doing the same when it examines a rights
claim in light of the government's "compelling interest," in strict
scrutiny analysis. In contrast, the German and Israeli Courts move
more systematically to the final, balancing stage, especially when it
comes to the most politically controversial issues. Compared with
the Canadian Court, the German Court seems to calculate the
legitimacy costs of doing so differently.337 It uses the first two stages
to pay its respects, first, to the importance of the policy consideration
337. See Grimm, supra note 100, at 393-95.
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generally and, second, to the legislator's own deliberations on the
proportionality of the law. If and how such differences actually
matter to outcomes (right protection, policymaking, the relationship
between judges and legislators) remains a mystery, but is worthy of
exploration.
Last, although PA today dominates all other approaches to
rights adjudication, courts could proceed otherwise. Judges could
develop and maintain strong deference doctrines, assuring that
"judicial" authority to supervise "political" authority-when it comes
to balancing situations-would be exercised only at the margins,
rather than systematically. In our view, traditional reasonableness
338postures are defensible, but not from the standpoint of modem
constitutionalism. In the United States, the Supreme Court has
developed a complicated, variegated approach to rights, in part
because of its deep ambivalence toward balancing. The Court has
constructed some rights (e.g., political speech) as quasi-absolute-
shields against (or "trumps" with respect to) state acts. For other
classes of rights (e.g., those covered by the due process and equal
protection clauses), the Court has assigned different standards of
review to government measures, as if the underlying rights involved
were arrayed on a sliding scale of importance. Measures that infringe
on important rights are subject to strict scrutiny (LRM-testing), while
less important rights get intermediate or rational basis (i.e., virtually
no) review. One can also portray the Court's method in negative
terms, defining the scope of rights through excluding reasons: the
Court decides which justifications given by the government for
limiting a right are constitutionally inadmissible. In our view, all of
these outcomes, to the extent that they are stable, can be traced back
to seminal acts of balancing that then congeal as precedent. In any
event, it is obvious that the Court has never been able to dispense
with balancing. 339 In the next part of this project, we will examine
why this is so, as we assess the evolution of American rights doctrine
in light of proportionality.
338. Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogues Between Judges and Legislators, 23
SuP. CT. L.REv. 7 (2004).
339. Aleinikoff, supra note 11.
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